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For decades, China has maintained State import monopoly in cultural
products. The opaque State trading operations ensure a maximum level
of flexibility and efficacy in the government censorship of imports. The
WTO judiciary held in the China-Publications case that this practice is
inconsistent with China's trading rights commitments under its Accession
Protocol and cannot be justified by the public morals exception of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. To comply with the WTO
ruling, China must restructure its censorship regime, which it apparently
is not prepared to do. This article analyses the implications of the WTO
decision and provides a critical assessment of the new WTO jurisprudence
regarding trading rights and the China Accession Protocol.
1. On 19 January 2010, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the World Trade
Organization adopted the Appellate Body (AB) report in China-Measures Affecting
Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual
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Entertainment Products (China-Publications),' and the Panel report2 as modified by
the AB report. 3 The AB and Panel found that China violated WTO law by not
allowing non-State-owned entities to engage in the importation of cultural products
(including books, magazines, newspapers, electronic publications, DVDs, sound
recordings and films) and by prohibiting foreign entities from engaging in the dis-
tribution services for cultural products inside China. More specifically, the WTO
judiciary held that China's restrictions on the right to import are inconsistent
with its commitments to liberalize trading rights under its Accession Protocol,
4
and that its restrictions on distribution services are inconsistent with its obligations
under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Most significantly, the WTO judges rejected
China's defence that its restrictions on trading rights are necessary for the conduct of
censorship and can therefore be justified by the "public morals" exception of the
GATT.
2. China was given 14 months, or until 19 March 2011, to comply with the
WTO rulings. At the time of writing, China has issued and proposed several
amendments to its regulations concerning the right to import cultural products.
But these amendments have all fallen short of meeting the \WTO requirements.
3. China's failure to fully implement the WTO ruling, however, is not surprising.
For decades, China has imposed ownership restrictions on its cultural industry, a
sector deemed most politically sensitive to the Communist Party. Although owner-
ship restrictions have been gradually relaxed in recent years, certain activities still
remain off-limits to private enterprises, including the importation of cultural pro-
ducts. Under this system, only selected State-owned entities (SOEs) are authorized
to import cultural and information products, and they are entrusted with the task of
conducting censorship in the process. Such exclusive State trading ensures direct
government control over the inflow of foreign contents. More critically, it allows
the government to keep its censorship process non-transparent, which provides
the system with the maximum level of flexibility and efficacy desired.
4. Thus, to comply with the WTO ruling would require the Chinese government
to embark on serious systemic reforms. It would have to dismantle the decades-old
State import monopoly and allow all domestic and foreign private entities to engage
in the importation of sensitive products. And to do so, it would have to restructure
its censorship regime and forgo State trading as its preferred means of political
1 W/DS363/AB/R (21 December 2009) (hereinafter, "AB Report").
2 Panel Report, China-Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for
Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/R (12 August
2009) (hereinafter, "Panel Report").
3 WT/DS363/14 (21 January 2010).
4 Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China, WT/L/432 (10 November
2001) (hereinafter, "Accession Protocol" or "Protocol").
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control over content imports. Such systemic reforms could not occur without
support from the leadership of the Communist Party. That support, however,
seems unlikely in the current political environment.
5. In requiring China to undertake these systemic reforms, the WTO judiciary
has pushed global governance 5 to a new level-never before has any international
organization or tribunal mandated changes of such political nature in the domestic
system of a sovereign nation. This far-reaching decision, however, is not accidental.
It is consistent with the trend of expansion in WTO governance. Traditionally, the
world trading system was concerned solely with economic protectionism when
domestic regulations were at issue. Accordingly, domestic measures restricting
trade were permitted so long as they were not discriminatory against imported pro-
ducts or otherwise taken for protectionist purposes. With the establishment of the
WTO, the system has expanded to cover many areas that were traditionally under
the domestic regulatory domain, such as intellectual property rights, health and
safety standards, investment policies and domestic subsidies. New rules in these
areas have empowered the WTO judiciary to engage in more intrusive review of
domestic regulations and to invalidate national measures for being inconsistent
with international standards regardless of whether they are protectionist in design.
The WTO jurisdiction has been further expanded through its accession regime.
Countries applying to join the system after the Cold War have been typically
required to take on additional ("WTO-plus") obligations with respect to their dom-
estic policies and regulatory system. 6 Liberalizing trading rights is one such obli-
gation. China-Publications is the first case involving a major WTO-plus
obligation. 7 The AB and Panel construed this obligation strictly, and the result is
a resounding confirmation of the expansive reach of the WTO.
5 The term "global governance" refers to the sum of laws, norms, policies and institutions that
define, constitute and mediate relations among citizens, society, markets and the State in the
international arena. Thomas G. Weiss and Ramesh Thakur, Global Governance and the UN:
An Unfinished Journey (Indiana University Press, 2010), 6. "The prevailing state of affairs in
global governance at any given time is shaped by an ever-present tension between the need to
internationalize rules and the desire to assert and retain national control." John Gerard
Ruggie, "Foreword", in: Weiss and Thakur, id., xv.
6 The scope and types of WTO-plus provisions vary from country to country, with those for
China being most extensive and far-reaching. For summary of the special commitments of
acceding members, see WTO Secretariat, Technical Note on the Accession Process, WT/
ACC/10/Rev.4/Add.1 (25 May 2010). See also Steve Charnovitz, Mapping the Law of
WTO Accession, in: Merit E. Janow, Victoria Donaldson and Alan Yanovich (eds.), The
WTO: Governance, Dispute Settlement and Developing Countries (Juris Publishing,
2008), ch. 46; Julia Ya Qin, "WTO-Plus" Obligations and Their Implications for the
WTO Legal System - An Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol, 37 Journal of
World Trade (2003), 483.
7 For disputes involving other WTO-plus obligations, see Julia Ya Qin, The Challenge of
Interpreting "WTO-Plus" Provisions, 44 Journal of World Trade (2010), 127.
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6. Focusing on the trading rights portion of the WTO decision, 8 this Commen-
tary aims to make two contributions. Firstly, it seeks to explain the implications of
the WTO decision for China's domestic system. Such implications tend to be
underestimated by outside observers.9 Secondly, it provides a critical assessment
of the new jurisprudence on trading rights and China's Accession Protocol. It con-
tends that while the AB has broken new ground in integrating Member-specific
accession obligations with the generally applicable WTO rules, its legal reasoning
contains serious flaws. These flaws seriously impair the quality of its decision,
casting doubts on the soundness of the final outcome. The interpretive problems
exposed in this case demonstrate the special challenge of interpreting Member-
specific obligations within the WTO multilateral framework. But they are ultimately
attributable to the narrow textualist approach taken by the WTO judiciary.
7. The rest of the article will proceed as follows. Section I provides the background
of China's trading rights obligations, a summary of the Panel and AB decisions and
the status of China's compliance. Section II analyses the implications of the WTO
ruling for China's domestic system, focusing on its censorship regime, economic
reform and foreign trade. Section III evaluates the new jurisprudence concerning
trading rights and the Accession Protocol and identifies the sources of the interpretive
problems exposed in the WTO decision. Section IV sets forth the conclusion.
I. An Overview
I.A. Trading rights and political censorship: a general background
8. China acceded to the WTO in December 2001. As part of its accession commit-
ments, China agreed that, within three years after accession, "all enterprises in
China", and "all foreign individuals and enterprises, including those not invested
or registered in China", would have the right to import and export all goods
throughout its customs territory, except for a list of products reserved for trading
by designated SOEs. 10 The list of products reserved for State trading is set out in
8 The issue of censorship was raised only in the context of trading rights. It is unclear why
China did not invoke the public morals exception under the GATS to defend its restrictions
on distribution rights.
9 For previous commentaries on this case, see Joost Pauwelyn, Squaring Free Trade in Culture
with Chinese Censorship: The WTO Appellate Body Report in China-Audiovisuals, 11 Mel-
bourne JIL (2008), 1; Xiaohui Wu, Case Note: China-Measures Affecting Trading Rights
and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products
(WT/DS363/AB/R), 9 Chinese JIL (2010), 415; Jingxia Shi and Weidong Chen, The
"Specificity" of Cultural Products v. the "Generality" of Trade Obligations: Reflecting on
China-Publications and Audiovisual Products, 45 Journal of World Trade (2011), 159.
10 Protocol, paras.5.1 and 5.2; Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, WT/
MIN(01)/3 (10 November 2001) (hereinafter, "Working Party Report", or "WPR"),
paras.83 and 84, which were incorporated into the Protocol. The right of all foreign individ-
uals and enterprises to trade is granted under the national treatment clause of paragraph 5.2
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Annex 2A of the Accession Protocol, which includes 84 products for importation
and 134 products for exportation. The 84 products subject to State trading for
importation fall under the categories of grain, vegetable oil, sugar, tobacco, pro-
cessed oil, chemical fertilizer and cotton. No cultural or information product is
mentioned in Annex 2A.
9. China's commitment to liberalize trading rights was a critical step in the
reform of its foreign trade regime. Prior to the mid-1980s, all foreign trade in
China was conducted by State trading firms. In the next 20 years, the State
trading system was considerably liberalized. By the time of China's accession,
numerous domestic and foreign entities had obtained the right to engage in
imports and exports directly. Nonetheless, the government still controlled the allo-
cation of trading rights through an entity-by-entity approval system. This system was
put to an end in 2004 when China implemented its trading rights commitments to
the WTO. Under the revised Foreign Trade Law, operating import and export
businesses in China no longer requires government approval; instead, any person
wishing to engage in foreign trade may do so simply by completing a registration
procedure with the Ministry of Commerce. 1 The implementation of the WTO
commitments, therefore, has fundamentally changed the way China conducts its
foreign trade.
10. Despite the fact that cultural and information products are not among those
specifically reserved for State trading under the Accession Protocol, China has never
liberalized the right to import these products. On the contrary, following the
amendment of the Foreign Trade Law, the government reiterated its policy of pro-
hibiting non-State capital from engaging in the importation of cultural products. 
12
This prohibition is part of a long-standing policy that the Chinese government has
maintained in the media and cultural industries. Although China's media and cul-
tural sectors have become increasingly commercialized over time, 13 the government
of the Protocol. Paragraph 84 of the WPR further provides that China would "eliminate its
system of examination and approval of trading rights within three years after accession" and
that such rights would be "granted in a non-discriminatory and non-discretionary way."
11 Documents required for registration are mostly for identification purposes. The Ministry of
Commerce must complete the registration within five days of receipt of the required docu-
ments. Foreign Trade Law of the People's Republic of China, as amended, effective 1 July
2004, arts. 8 and 9.
12 See, e.g., The Catalogue for Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries, Order [2004] No.
24 of the State Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Commerce (30
November 2004) ("Industry Catalogue"); The Several Opinions of the Ministry of
Culture, State Administration of Radio, Film and Television, General Administration of
Press and Publication, National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry
of Commerce on Introducing Foreign Investment into the Cultural Sector, Order [2005]
No. 19 of the Ministry of Culture (6 July 2005).
13 Except for a few media outlets directly controlled by the Party, Chinese media enterprises
must finance themselves mostly through subscriptions and advertisement. See Benjamin
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has maintained firm control over these sensitive domains. Such control is exercised
through censorship of press, media and the Internet, which is carried out to a large
extent by maintaining dominant State ownership in these industries. Thus, under
Chinese law, private capital is prohibited from owning or operating news agencies,
publishing houses, radio or TV stations, and from engaging in the import of cultural
products.14 Foreign investment in the media and cultural sectors is strictly limited,15
because the Party is particularly concerned with foreign influences that it deems as
conveying ideas that could impair or subvert its rule.
1 6
11. The relationship between State ownership and censorship needs to be under-
stood in the light of the way in which content is regulated in China. Formally under
Chinese law, censorship criteria are formulated in very broad and vague terms. Prohib-
ited content, for example, includes any materials that "defy the basic principles of the
Constitution", "injure the national glory and interests", "incite hatred or discrimi-
nation" or "infringe upon customs and habits of the nationalities", "propagate evil
cults or superstition" or "disturb public order or destroys social stability". 17 Conse-
quently, whether a particular item is deemed to be within a prohibited category
depends on interpretation. In practice, China's content-control system relies on a com-
bination of internal instructions from the Party's propaganda authorities, a system of
publisher and editor responsibility for content (self-censorship) and post-publication
sanctions for those who violate explicit or implicit limits.' 8 Although pre-publication
review of content is sometimes required, it is generally not key to overall Party manage-
ment of the media.' 9 Editors who breach Party norms or who misjudge the prevailing
political winds risk loss of their positions or suffer more severe punishment.
20
12. This exceedingly opaque system allows the Party to adjust its censorship cri-
teria constantly according to the perceived danger of the day, and it works best with
Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue? The Media in the Chinese Legal System, 105 Columbia
LR (2005), 1, 23-28. See also, Sigrun Abels, State vs. Market: Media in Transition, Inter-
national Institute for Asian Studies News Letter, No. 37 (June 2005).
14 State Council, Several Decisions concerning the Entry of Non-State Capital into Cultural
Industries, Guofa [2005] No. 10 (13 April 2005), para.9. Despite the restriction, an increas-
ing number of private companies have entered the publishing business unofficially and are
operating in a grey area.
15 The Industry Catalogue, originally issued in 1995 and revised in 1997, 2002, 2004 and
2007, has consistently listed news organizations, newspapers, publishing houses, radio and
TV stations, and importation of various cultural products under the category of "Prohibited"
sectors for foreign investment.
16 Stanley Lubman, Looking for Law in China, 20 Columbia Journal of Asian Law (2006), 1,
21.
17 State Council, Regulation on the Administration of Publications, Order No. 343 (25
December 2001), art. 26, quoted in Panel Report, para.7.760.
18 Liebman, above n.13, at 41-42.
19 Id., n.168.
20 Id., at 42.
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State-owned entities whose management personnel are controlled by the govern-
ment. It is for this reason that the government has kept State import monopoly
in the cultural sector. By entrusting a small group of SOEs with the task of import-
ing cultural products, the Party can exert control over foreign content most effec-
tively and efficiently.
13. There is no question that the current system is anti-competitive-a small
number of SOEs are guaranteed monopoly profits in the fast-growing content
industry. And these SOEs have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo.
However, China's policy of maintaining State import monopoly in cultural pro-
ducts is fundamentally driven by political rather than economic reasons. The pol-
itical nature of this policy can also be observed from the absence of the usual
trade barriers: China does not impose tariffs or quotas on the imports of reading
materials or audiovisual products. Although the SOE importers may restrict the
quantity of particular imports at government behest, under the current system
they also have financial incentives to maximize imports for profit.
2 1
14. In the light of the political nature of this policy and the consistency with
which this policy has been implemented under Chinese law, it should be evident
that the Chinese government never intended to liberalize trading rights in the cul-
tural sector. It was simply not possible that the Chinese government would deem
State trading in foreign publications as less important than in vegetable oil or chemi-
cal fertilizer. The Chinese negotiators apparently neglected to include cultural pro-
ducts in the State trading list of Annex 2A of the Accession Protocol. The
government officials may well have taken for granted the exclusion of cultural pro-
ducts from the trading rights commitments. From their perspective, it would not be
necessary to mention cultural products in Annex 2A, just as it would not necessary
to mention weaponry and military equipment, the trading of which is also restricted
to designated SOEs.
I.B. The WTO decision on trading rights
15. The dispute over trading rights was brought by the United States on 10 April
2007.22 The United States claimed that China was acting inconsistently with its
21 See above n. 13. In addition to being financially independent, the SOE importers can keep all
their profits. China only began to require certain SOEs to pay dividends to the government in
2008, which did not include the SOE content importers. For the new dividend policy, see
Andrew Batson, China Seeks Funds from State Firms: Many State Enterprises Must Pay
Higher Dividends as Their Role Is Reassessed, Wall Street Journal, 9 November 2010
(online.wsj.com).
22 The United States simultaneously filed another WTO case, complaining about the lack of
protection of intellectual property rights in China. The United States won a limited
victory in the case. See Panel Report, China-Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforce-
ment of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/R, adopted 20 March 2009 (China-IP
Rights). Both cases were driven by the US content industry, which was interested in boosting
exports to China while protecting its products from rampant copyright piracy in the country.
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obligations under the Accession Protocol "by not allowing all Chinese enterprises
and all foreign enterprises and individuals to have the right to import into the
customs territory of China the following products (collectively, the 'Products'):
films for theatrical release, publications (e.g., books, magazines, newspapers and
electronic publications), audiovisual home entertainment products (e.g., video cas-
settes and DVDs), and sound recordings." 23 The United States identified ten
Chinese regulations and rules as the measures at issue.
16. The Panel issued its report on 12 August 2009. It was relatively straightfor-
ward for the Panel to find that the various measures at issue were inconsistent with
China's trading rights commitments, since cultural products are not among the pro-
ducts reserved for State trading under Annex 2A of the Accession Protocol.24
17. In defending its measures, China invoked GATT Article XX(a), which allows
a Member to adopt or enforce measures "necessary to protect public morals."
China's defence raised two major interpretive questions: (1) whether GATT
Article XX is applicable to the Accession Protocol; and (2) if so, whether China's
measures meet the requirements of Article XX(a).
18. On the applicability of GATT Article XX, the Panel decided not to answer
the question directly. Instead, it applied Article XX(a) on an arguendo basis.2 5
This approach allowed the Panel to examine whether China's measures satisfy the
requirements of Article XX(a) on the assumption that the article applies. Only if
the result of that examination were positive would it need to revert to the issue of
applicability of Article XX.
19. On the requirement of Article XX(a), China claimed that its restrictions on
the right to import cultural products are "necessary to protect public morals"
because such restrictions ensure an effective and efficient content review mechanism.
According to China, only the selected SOEs have a suitable organizational structure,
an appropriate geographic coverage and a reliable, competent and capable personnel
to perform the content review tasks properly. 26 Countering China's arguments, the
United States claimed that SOE import monopolies are not necessary for content
review because content review is independent of importation and can be performed
by individuals or entities unrelated to the importation process.
27
23 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, WT/DS363/5 (11 October
2007).
24 Panel Report, para.7.70 6 .
25 Panel Report, paras.7.7 4 4 -7.7 45. The United States invited the Panel to follow this
approach, which was adopted by the Appellate Body in United States-Measures relating
to Shrimp from Thailand (DS343), United States-Customs Bond Directive for Merchan-
dise Subject to Antidumping/Countervailing Duties (DS345), WT/DS343/AB/R, W/T/
DS345/AB/R, adopted 1 August 2008, paras.30 4 -319.
26 Panel Report, para.7.715.
27 Panel Report, paras.7.717-7.718.
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20. Although this is the first case involving interpretation of GATT Article XX(a),
the Appellate Body has interpreted the "necessity" test under GATT Article XX(b)
28
and (d),29 as well as GATS Article XIV(a) 30 which contains a similar public morals
exception as GAT Article XX(a). The previous cases have established that assessing
"necessity" involves a process of "weighing and balancing" several factors, including
(i) the relative importance of the interests furthered by the challenged measure, (ii)
the contribution of the measure to the realization of the ends pursued, and (iii) the
restrictive impact of the measure on trade. In addition, the panel must consider
whether there is a reasonably available alternative that would make an equivalent
contribution to the achievement of the ends pursued, but have a less trade-restrictive
effect than the measure at issue.
21. Applying the necessity test in this case, the Panel first considered the interests
to be furthered by the measures at issue. It noted that the United States did not
specifically argue that China's measures were not measures to protect public
morals, but rather challenged the means China chose to achieve the objective of pro-
tecting public morals. 3 ' The Panel therefore had no difficulty in establishing the
link between content review and public morals, finding that the protection of
public morals is a highly important value and that China has adopted a high
level of protection within its territory.
32
22. The Panel, however, was "not persuaded" that the State-ownership require-
ment of import entities made a "material contribution" to the protection of
public morals. 33 In response to China's arguments that only SOEs are suitable to
conduct content review because they have proper organizations and qualified per-
sonnel and are able to bear the high costs associated with content review, the
Panel stated that it was "not convinced" that the associated costs would be so
high as to make it impossible, or not worthwhile, for private enterprises to attract
28 For example, AB Report, Brazil-Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/
DS332/AB/R, adopted 17 December 2007 (Brazil-Tyres).
29 For example, AB Report, Korea-Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen
Beef, WT/DS161, 169/AB/R, adopted 10 January 2001.
30 AB Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-border Supply of Gambling and
Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted 20 April 2005 (US-Gambling).
31 Panel Report, paras.7.75 6 , 7.762-7.763.
32 Panel Report, paras.7.81 6 -7. 8 19. The lack of scrutiny on what constitute "public morals" in
this case was criticized by Pauwelyn, above n.9, at 14-17.
33 Panel Report, para.7.863. In this regard, the Panel found that one group of the measures,
which set the "criteria" for selecting import entities (the "criteria provisions"), was apt to
make a "material contribution" to the protection of public morals, but ultimately found
that the criteria provisions failed the necessity test because there was a less restrictive alterna-
tive available. The AB reversed the Panel's finding on "material contribution" of the criteria
provisions, but upheld the Panel's application of the less restrictive test to them. See AB
Report, paras.299, 332.
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qualified personnel or obtain the organizational know-how needed to conduct
content review properly.
34
23. Regarding the restrictive impact, the Panel received no evidence that the
measures restricted imports. 35 But the Panel decided to examine, additionally, the
impact of the measures on those who may wish to engage in importing cultural pro-
ducts.36 Since the measures prohibit all private domestic and foreign entities from
engaging in importation of cultural products, their restrictive impact on potential
importers is complete. Weighing the high value of protecting public morals
against the severe restrictive impact on potential importers and the lack of a material
contribution of the measures to the goal, the Panel was able to conclude that the
measures were not "necessary" to protect public morals.
37
24. The Panel further examined the "reasonably available alternative" with respect
to some of the measures challenged. It found that the US proposal that the Chinese
government be given the sole responsibility for the conduct of the content review is
such an alternative, because it would make an equivalent or better contribution to
the objective of protecting public morals, but with a significantly less restrictive
impact on potential traders.38 Although the Panel recognized that the proposed
alternative might require China to allocate additional human and financial resources
to the task of content review, it found the alternative to be reasonably available
because China had not demonstrated that it would impose "an undue burden",
financially or otherwise. 3 9 Having made this finding, the Panel was able to reach
its overall conclusion that China's measures are inconsistent with its trading
rights commitments and, assuming Article XX(a) applies, such inconsistency
cannot be justified by Article XX(a).4 °
25. On appeal from China, the Appellate Body upheld all the key findings of the
Panel. Significantly though, the AB disagreed with the Panel's approach of applying
Article XX to the Protocol provisions on an arguendo basis. Instead, it held that
China may invoke GATT Article XX(a) directly as a defence for the breach of its
trading rights commitments under the Accession Protocol. The AB decision will
be analysed in Section III.
34 Panel Report, para.7.858.
35 Data submitted by China showed that imports of reading materials and audiovisual products
increased significantly between 2002 and 2006. Id., para.7.807.
36 Panel Report, para.7.788.
37 Id., paras.7.837-7.8 6 8.
38 Id., para.7.899.
39 Id., paras.7.903-7.906.
40 Since China's measures did not meet the necessity test, the Panel did not examine the require-
ment of the chapeau of Article XX that such measures "are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where
the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade". Id., para.7.912.
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I.C. Status of compliance
26. China declared its intention to implement the WTO rulings, but requested a
reasonable period of time to do so. In July 2010, China and the United States
reached an agreement that the reasonable period for China to comply should be
14 months from the date of adoption of the AB and Panel Reports, that is, until
19 March 2011.
4 1
27. On 14 March 2011, China notified the DSB that it had "completed amend-
ments to most measures at issue". Considering the dispute is embodied with "more
complexity and sensitivity than other disputes", China hoped that "relevant WTO
Members could understand the difficult and complicated situation China is facing
• i - ,,42
during the process of implementation .
28. On 19 March 2011, the State Council of China issued amendments to the
Regulations on the Management of Publications 43 and the Regulations on the Manage-
ment ofAudiovisual Products.44 Pursuant to the amended Regulations, only entities
specifically approved by the government may engage in the importation of reading
materials and audiovisual products. 45 This contrasts sharply with China's regis-
tration-only system for the importers of other products. 46 On the qualifications
of importers, the amended Regulations eliminated the requirement that importers
be wholly State-owned and specifically designated by the government, but added
a requirement that the importer must have the ability to conduct content
review. 47 It remains to be seen whether in practice the government will approve
private and foreign entities to be importers, and if so, under what conditions.
29. At the time of writing, revisions of other regulations are still under consider-
ation, including the regulation on the right to import foreign films. On 2 April
2011, the government published a draft Catalogue for Guidance of Foreign Invest-
ment Industries for public comments.4 8 The draft Catalogue deleted from the
"Prohibited" category foreign investment in the importation of publications and
audiovisual products. Presumably, such investment will become permitted.
However, because under Chinese law all foreign investment projects must be specifi-
cally approved by the government, this revision to the Catalogue will not result in
the right to import cultural products being automatically granted to foreign
investors.
41 WT/DS363/16 (13 July 2010).
42 WT/DS363/17/Add.2 (15 March 2011).
43 State Council Order No. 594 (19 March 2011) (Regulations on Publications).
44 State Council Order No. 595 (19 March 2011) (Regulations on Audiovisuals).
45 See Regulations on Publications, arts. 41, 43; Regulations on Audiovisuals, art. 27.
46 See above text to n.11.
47 See Regulations on Publications, art. 42.
48 Notice of Solicitation of Public Comment on the Amended Catalogue for Guidance of
Foreign Investment Industries (www.gov.cn/gzdt/2011-04/02/content_1836908.htm).
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30. In sum, judging from the regulatory changes made or proposed thus far,
China has not complied with the WTO ruling requiring it to grant the right to
import cultural products in accordance with its trading rights commitments, that
is, to grant such right to "all enterprises in China" and "all foreign individuals
and enterprises" in a "non-discriminatory and non-discretionary" manner.
4 9
Although the formal requirement of State ownership of importers has been
removed, the government has retained full discretion in approving importers, and
the actual criteria for approval remain unclear.
II. Implications of the WTO decision for China's domestic system
31. To understand why China has not been able to fully implement the WTO
ruling on trading rights, it is necessary to examine the ruling's implications for
China's domestic system. Because China's restrictions on trading rights are political
and systemic in nature, the removal of these restrictions would have political and
systemic consequences for China.
II.A. Implications for economic reform
32. While State ownership continues to dominate China's media and culture
sectors, the government has been pushing commercialization of the sectors in the
past decades. The major policy measures taken include the transformation of
SOEs into for-profit enterprises, and a gradual easing of the restrictions on the
entrance of private enterprises into the sectors. 50 As a result, a marketplace with
fierce competition has emerged, and the media and cultural industries have
flourished.5 1
33. In the wake of the global financial crisis, the government has adopted a new
policy of encouraging a broader participation of private capital in the traditionally
State-dominated sectors. A key policy document issued by the State Council in May
2010 identifies several areas in the cultural industry, including printing, distribution
of publications and the Internet culture, as among the industries in which private
49 Above n.10.
50 According to the China Internet Information Center, an authorized government portal site,
while public ownership is the mainstay, non-public ownership participates in 90 per cent of
the 357 000 press and publishing companies in China, including over 2500 printing
businesses and more than 40 distribution companies that are joint ventures with foreign
investment. See Background Materials on the Reform and Development of the Press and
Publication Sectors (20 August 2010) (www.china.org.cn/china/2010-08/20/
content_20756721.htm).
51 In 2009, China saw the publishing of 302 000 titles, 1937 newspapers, 9851 periodicals,
25384 audiovisual products and 10708 e-publications. China ranked first, first, second
and third in the world in terms of the size of daily newspaper publishing, the total
number and print run of titles, the size of e-book publishing and total output of the printing
and reproduction business, respectively. Id.
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investment is to be encouraged.52 The general trend, therefore, is towards further
relaxation of ownership control and promoting greater diversity in the cultural
sector.
34. Despite this general trend, importation of cultural products has remained off-
limits to non-State-owned entities. The implementation of the WTO ruling, there-
fore, would not only benefit foreign companies wanting to sell their content pro-
ducts directly to Chinese consumers, but more significantly, it would help
advance privatization in the cultural sector. Whether the government is prepared
to dismantle this bastion of State ownership, however, will depend on whether its
censorship regime can be reformed.
II.B. Implications for the censorship regime
35. Although the WTO decision does not require China to reduce its political cen-
sorship or change its censorship criteria, it does require China to alter the way in
which its censorship on imports is conducted. The required changes would affect
not only the institutional setup but also the operation and effect of the censorship
regime.
II.B.i. Restructuring of government apparatus
36. Under the existing system, content review of imports is conducted by different
institutions. For books, newspapers and periodicals, day-to-day content review is
performed by the import entities designated by the General Administration of
Press and Publication (GAPP). As of 2008, 42 wholly State-owned entities were
approved to import reading materials into China.5 3 The importing entities
submit to the GAPP, prior to importation, a list of materials intended for importa-
tion. While the GAPP may intervene in day-to-day content review after receiving
the list, it mainly exercises a supervisory role by conducting annual inspections of
the import entities. 54 For electronic publications, the GAPP performs final
content review of samples brought into China through temporary import pro-
cedures.5 5 For audiovisual products, only one wholly State-owned entity has been
approved to import finished products. 56 Similar to electronic publications, the
GAPP conducts final content review of samples of audiovisual products temporarily
imported.57 As for films for theatrical release, China has an import quota of 20
motion pictures per year.58 Only one wholly State-owned entity is approved to
52 See Several Opinions of the State Council on Encouraging and Guiding Healthy Develop-
ment of Private Investment, Guofa [2010] No. 13 (7 May 2010) (also known as "the New 36
Provisions"), art. 17.
53 AB Report, fn.251.
54 AB Report, para.1 4 5.
55 Id.
56 AB Report, para.153. It is unclear how many entities are approved to import unfinished
audiovisual products. Id., fn.281.
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import them, and the government agency responsible for reviewing imported
samples is the State Administration on Radio, Film and Television.
59
37. If China were to accept the censorship method proposed by the WTO, it
would need to centralize content review of all printed imports, which would
require the GAPP to set up a new government agency to handle the tremendous
volume of such imports. The existing central review agencies for electronic publi-
cations and audiovisual products would also need to expand their capacities signifi-
cantly in order to handle the submission of samples by numerous domestic and
foreign importers. To these ends, the government would need to hire and train a
large number of additional personnel to perform content review so as to cover all
geographic regions in China, and might need to relocate many in-house content
reviewers currently employed by the dozens of SOE importers. In addition to the
substantial cost involved, the bureaucratic reorganization could have a disruptive
effect on the lives of numerous government employees. As China submitted, the
government restructuring required would be "tremendous".
60
I.B.ii. Transparency and due process
38. The most significant impact of the WTO ruling, however, would be on the pro-
cedural aspects of China's censorship regime. Currently, the designated SOE impor-
ters determine, through their internal review process, whether the content of a
particular item falls within the prohibited categories. The specific criteria used by
the SOEs are unknown to the public and the entire review process is non-
transparent.
39. The secrecy of China's censorship criteria is by design. Through internal
Party channels, the Central Propaganda Department (CPD), the most powerful
body in the censorship regime, issues directives and guidelines and coordinates
with the government agencies in charge of the media and cultural industries to
implement its instructions. 61 The CPD adjusts its censorship criteria constantly
as it reacts to current events and developments, trying to balance the need for infor-
mation, which is critical for the nation's economic development, with the need to
prevent the type of freedom of information that may lead to the downfall of the
Communist Party.62 The CPD instructions are deemed "State secrets", the
57 Prior to March 2011, the authority to conduct such review was vested in the Ministry of
Culture. See Regulations on Audiovisuals, above n.44, art. 28.
58 Accession Protocol, China's Services Schedule, Section 2D.
59 AB Report, para.159 and fn.294.
60 AB Report, para.322.
61 See Council on Foreign Relations, Media Censorship in China, by Preeti Bhattacharji, Carin
Zissis and Corinne Baldwin (27 May 2010) (www.cfr.org/publication/11515/
media_censorship-in_china.html).
62 The media policy of the Party has been in the state of "schizophrenia", as it goes back and
forth, constantly testing the line. Id.
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publicizing of which may lead to severe punishment. 63 In addition to the desire for
flexibility, the Party also has no interest in publicizing the titles of banned materials
lest it would stoke heightened interest in the "forbidden fruit", increasing the risk of
smuggling and underground circulation of the banned materials. 64 This system is by
now deeply entrenched.
40. Interestingly though, Chinese citizens have begun to challenge the opacity of
the censorship regime. It was widely reported that a Chinese scholar sued a customs
office in Guangzhou over the confiscation of books he brought back from Hong
Kong. 65 He claimed that the seizure was unlawful because the customs refused to
show him the internal document that supposedly listed those books as banned
and that there was no index of banned books publicly available. According to the
reports, similar cases had been lodged against the customs in Beijing and Fuzhou
previously.66 Unsurprisingly, however, none of the plaintiffs prevailed in those
lawsuits.
41. The particular design of China's censorship regime works effectively and effi-
ciently with SOEs because their personnel are trusted and effectively controlled by
the government. In contrast with this SOE-based censorship regime, if all content
review of imports were to be performed by a central government agency, as rec-
ommended by the WTO, that agency might soon be under public pressure to
make the censorship process more transparent. Imagine if numerous foreign com-
panies were to be prevented from importing various contents and the government
would not explain why the particular content was disallowed. Sooner or later,
some importers would begin to complain about the lack of due process and trans-
parency in the process, and such complaints would be widely reported.
42. Furthermore, unlike the Chinese cases mentioned above, a lack of transpar-
ency and due process in the review process for commercial imports would raise an
issue of WTO inconsistency. GATT Article X, for example, requires a Member to
publish all of its laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of
general application pertaining to trade in goods. 67 Violations of Article X have
63 A journalist was detained in 2004 and sentenced to ten-year imprisonment for posting an
online summary of the CPD instructions on how to report the 15-year anniversary of
events at the Tiananmen Square. Id.
64 In addition, when people do not have a clear sense of what are being censored, they may be
oblivious to the effect of censorship, hence more likely to tolerate the regime. See Loretta
Chao and Jason Dean, China's Internet Censors Thrive by Confusing Web Users, Wall
Street Journal, 1 April 2010 (online.wsj.com).
65 See People's Daily Online, Customs Rejects Scholar's Appeal for Held Books, (english.
peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90782/90872/6850684.html), 24 December 2009; YANG
Zheng, Customs Seizes "Banned Books"; What Is the Basis?, Nanfang Zhoumo [Southern
Weekend], 22 October 2009.
66 Southern Weekend, id.
67 GATT Article X: 1. Similar provisions are contained in GATS Article III. GATT Article X: 1
further provides that a member is not required to disclose "confidential information which
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given rise to an increasing number of WTO claims.68 In addition to the generally
applicable WTO rules, China is also subject to more stringent requirements of
transparency and due process under the Accession Protocol. 69 One of the China-
specific transparency requirements has already been involved in a WTO
dispute.70 It is not inconceivable, therefore, that China's opaque and arbitrary
content review process could one day become the target of WTO complaints.
I.B.iii. Censorship effect
43. The WTO decision is not meant to affect the level of China's censorship.
However, if China were to adopt the WTO proposal and centralize all pre-importa-
tion review, the censorship on imports might become more restrictive than that
under the SOE in-house review system. That is because a centralized pre-importa-
tion review system would create a very different set of incentives. Currently, the
trusted SOE importers enjoy a great deal of discretion in interpreting the vaguely
worded censorship criteria. Their in-house reviewers do not necessarily share the
same political sensibility with the Party conservatives, and many veterans in the
business may favour a more liberal policy.7 1 Financially, since the SOEs are respon-
sible for their own operations, it is also not in their economic interest to construe the
criteria too strictly in order to restrict imports.
72
44. In contrast, if all content review were to be tasked to a government agency
independent of import entities, the incentives of its employees would be quite
would impede law enforcement or otherwise be contrary to the public interest". It is unclear
whether the confidentiality of censorship criteria could be construed as falling within this
exception.
68 See Padideh Ala'i, From the Periphery to the Center? The Evolving WTO Jurisprudence on
Transparency and Good Governance, 11 JIEL (2008), 1.
69 See Accession Protocol, paras.2(C) and 2(D). For analysis, see Qin, above n.6, at 491-497.
Note that the China-specific transparency requirements are not subject to any exception
under the Accession Protocol, in contrast with GAF Article X: 1. See above n.67.
70 See China-Measures concerning Wind Power Equipment, Request for Consultation by the
United States, WT/DS419/1 (6 January 2011). The United States claimed, inter alia, that
China has not made available a translation of these measures into one or more of the official
languages of the WTO, in violation of its obligation under the Accession Protocol.
71 In this regard, see an open letter condemning political censorship, authored by 23 Parry
elders, including former chief editors and top officials of more than a dozen major
Chinese newspapers, journals, publishing houses and TV station, at China Media Project,
Open Letter from Party Elders Calls for Free Speech (cmp.hku.hk/2010/10/13/8035/).
See also Jeremy Page, Chinese Elders Blast Censorship, Wall Street Journal, 14 October
2010 (online.wsj.com). The core demand of the open letter was to abolish all pre-publication
censorship by the government in favour of a true editor responsibility system. Ironically, the
WTO judiciary has directed China to move in an opposite direction: centralizing pre-pub-
lication reviews by the government on all cultural imports.
72 The discretion combined with the financial incentives has resulted in media that increasingly
seek to appeal to the public, and are willing to push the limits of permissible content. See
Liebman, above n.13, at 58-59.
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different. Accountable to the central censorship agency only, the reviewers would be
motivated to screen imports as rigorously and strictly as possible so as to justify their
bureaucratic existence. Such a phenomenon has already been observed in the Inter-
net censorship, where the number of blocked contents tends to grow over time,
thanks in no small part to the alleged 30 000-strong army of professionals hired
to police the Net.
73
45. If, in combination with a centralized review system, the government should
impose a legal duty on all private importers to self-censor, the restrictive effect of
the censorship would be even greater. As the experience in the Internet censorship
shows, when private businesses are required by law to practise self-censorship, they
tend to err on the side of caution and over-censor content that does not clearly
violate the rules.74 In other words, private importers might be inclined to go in
the direction opposite from that of the SOE importers who, with the trust of the
government, tend to push the envelope by importing content that might otherwise
be questionable.
II.C. Implications for foreign trade
46. Liberalizing trading rights in cultural products will require changes in customs
procedures that may adversely affect trade flow.7 5 Currently, with trusted SOEs in
charge of content imports, customs authorities can clear their goods with
minimum inspection. Should numerous private and foreign entities become impor-
ters of content products, customs would need to tighten inspections significantly.
The government would be especially concerned with smuggling of anti-government
content, such as those disseminated by a group banned by China as an "evil cult",
76
through private importers. As a result, the process of customs clearance could be
lengthened.
73 Established in 2000, the Internet police force reportedly employs 30 000 monitors and oper-
ates as a division within the police departments of 700 cities and provinces in China. CRS
Report for Congress, Internet Development and Information Control in the People's Repub-
lic of China, 22 November 2005 (www.cfr.org/publication/).
74 See Human Rights Watch, "Race to the Bottom": Corporate Complicity in Chinese Internet
Censorship, August 2006, Vol. 18, No. 8(C), 14 (www.hrw.org/reports/2006/chinaO806/
index.htm). See also Clive Thompson, Google's China Problem (and China's Google
Problem), New York Times, 23 April 2006 (reporting that as a result of the vague censorship
criteria and self-censor obligations, Internet executives in China most likely censor far more
material than they need to).
75 During the Panel proceeding, China argued that requiring the government to be solely
responsible for conducting the content review may adversely affect the efficiency of the
content review and trade flows because of the large quantities of reading materials imported,
the time constraints for newspapers and periodicals and the numerous customs entry points
through which reading materials are being imported. See Panel Report, paras.7.889-7.891.
76 This group in exile has been aggressive in producing publications overseas condemning the
Communist Party, including a newspaper distributed for free in eight languages and 30
countries. See Thomas Lum, CRS Report for Congress, RL 33437, 11 August 2006.
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47. It is difficult to predict whether liberalization of trading rights would result in
a significant increase in China's cultural imports. On the one hand, when Chinese
consumers can buy from foreign producers directly, rather than going through
State-designated importers, they should be able to get a better price, thus increasing
the consumption of foreign content. And imports of certain types of products, such
as religious titles, could grow significantly if no import ban or quotas are imposed.
On the other hand, the government might decide to charge fees for performing
content review externally, as suggested by the WTO decision, 77 which could
offset or reduce the pricing gains from direct purchases.
48. It is also possible that the volume of imports will be negatively affected if
content review is moved from SOE in-house to an external agency, due to a
different alignment of incentives. As previously explained, the designated SOEs
have financial incentives to import as much as possible in order to earn a
profit. Data submitted to the WTO indicate that the volume of cultural
imports grew considerably under the current system. 78 In contrast, if the
content review were to be tasked to a central government agency, the natural ten-
dency would be for the review process to be tightened. Furthermore, if potential
private importers were required to self-censor, there might be a chilling effect
further discouraging imports.
II.D. Future prospects for compliance
49. Prior to this case, China had kept a perfect record of complying with adverse
WTO decisions. In the first two cases in which its measures were found to be
WTO-inconsistent, 79 China fully implemented DSB rulings, including making
amendment to major national legislation. 8" And it had every incentive to keep
that record. Being the top exporter in the world, China relies on the WTO
system to maintain an open global trading environment. Non-compliance with
DSB rulings would cost dearly in political capital as China fights against protection-
ist trends in the post-financial crisis era.
50. Domestically, however, the political climate has not been conducive to
making the type of systemic changes required by the WTO ruling. Threatened by
rising social unrest in recent years, the government has been tightening its grip
77 In response to China's argument that the proposed alternative would be too expensive, the
Panel suggested that China could in any event charge fees for providing content review ser-
vices so as to lessen the financial burden of the government. Panel Report, para.7.905.
78 From 2002 to 2006, the number of newspaper titles imported into China increased from 586
to 767, the number of titles for periodicals increased from 36 032 to 45 178 and that for
audiovisual products from 11 464 to 31 123. Panel Report, para.7.807.
79 See AB Report, China-Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, WT/DS339, 340,
342/AB/R, adopted 12 January 2009; and China-IP Rights, above n.22.
80 China amended the Copyright Law to comply with the DSB rulings in China-IP Rights. See
WT/DS362/14/Add.2 (9 March 2010).
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on the media, the Internet and the censorship machine. 81 If there was previously
some hope that the Party reformists might be able to embrace the WTO decision
and leverage it to advance their political reform agenda, 82 any such hope has
been dashed after anonymous online calls for a revolution in China prompted
the government to react with harsh crackdowns.
83
51. In response to China's failure to meet the deadline for implementation, the
United States may initiate additional WTO proceedings to compel compliance. 
84
Under the current political climate, however, the prospects for full compliance
remain poor.
52. A lack of full compliance can lead to an eventual request by the United States
for WTO-sanctioned trade retaliations. In this regard, China may take to heart the
United States' practice in US-Gambling,85 a case that bears a certain resemblance to
China-Publications. In that case, Antigua challenged the US regulations prohibiting
Internet gambling as a breach of the US commitment to liberalize "recreational ser-
vices" under the GATS. The United States contended that its services commitments
did not include Internet gambling. To justify its measures, the United States also
invoked the public morals exception of GATS Article XIV(a), which contains
similar language as GATT XX(a). Siding with Antigua, the WTO judiciary
found that the United States had committed to liberalize Internet gambling, and
that while its measures were designed to protect public morals, the United States
had failed to demonstrate that the measures met the non-discrimination
requirements under the chapeau of Article XIV.86 After losing the case, the
81 See above n.61. See also Guardian, Timeline: Chinese Internet Censorship over the Last
Year, 14 January 2010 (www.guardian.co.uk); Xinhua News Agency, China to End Anon-
ymous Online Comments, 4 May 2010 (news.xinhuanet.com) (reporting government's
push to end anonymous online comments and to prevent "overseas hostile forces from infil-
trating through the Internet").
82 Premier Wen Jiabao made surprising calls for political reform in 2010. See, e.g., Reuters,
China Premier Wen Calls for Political Reform, 22 August 2010 (www.reuters.com);
Guardian, Wen Jiabao Talks Democracy and Freedom in CNN Interview, 4 October
2010 (www.guardian.co.uk). It is well known that reformists within the Party successfully
leveraged the WTO demands during the accession to advance their economic reform
agenda in the late 1990s when facing domestic opposition to the reforms. Dongli Huang,
Commentary on "Trade, Investment and Beyond", 191 The China Quarterly (September
2007), 742, 743.
83 See A. Ramzy, State Stamps Out Small 'Jasmine' Calls in China, Times, 21 February 2011
(www.time.com/time/); D. Pierson, Online Call for Protest in China Prompts Crackdown,
Los Angeles Times, 26 February 2011 (articles.latimes.com); Reuters, Beijing Says "Jasmine
Protest" Calls Doom to Fail, 6 March 2011 (www.reuters.com).
84 BNAWTO Reporter, U.S. Faults China's Implementation of Ruling on Audiovisual, Hints
of Further WTO Action, by Daniel Pruzin, 28 March 2011.
85 AB Report, above n.30.
86 Id., para.369. This AB decision has received much criticism. See, e.g., Joost Pauwelyn, Rien
ne Va Plus? Distinguishing Domestic Regulation from Market Access in GATT and GATS, 4
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United States claimed it had committed an "oversight" in drafting its services sche-
dule. 87 Instead of removing the restrictions, the United States has since renegotiated
its schedule with other Members to exclude gambling from its GATS commit-
ments. 88 With respect to Antigua, the United States has accepted WTO-sanctioned
trade retaliation of $21 million per year. 89 Similar to the United States in US-Gam-
bling, China could also claim an oversight in drafting the coverage of its trading
rights commitments. Unlike the United States, however, China might not be
able to renegotiate its commitments due to the legal uncertainty surrounding poss-
ible amendment to the Accession Protocol. 90 Nonetheless, China may follow the
US example in accepting WTO-sanctioned retaliation, 9 1 especially if the amount
is manageable.
92
53. The dispute may be resolved eventually through a negotiated settlement.
Instead of complete liberalization, China may agree to allow selected foreign entities
to import certain types of content products. 93 In exchange for accepting such partial
liberalization, the United States may demand additional market access in other
sectors as compensation. It might take years before a deal can be reached, and
World Trade Review (2005), 131; Federico Ortino, Treaty Interpretation and the WTO
Appellate Body Report in US-Gambling: A Critique, 9 JIEL (2006), 117; Petros
C. Mavroidis, Highway XIV Revisited: The Road of Non-discrimination to Market Access
in GATS, 6 World Trade Review (2007), 1; Douglas A. Irwin and Joseph Weiler, Measures
Affecting the Cross-border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (DS 285), 7 World
Trade Review (2008), 71, 89-95.
87 See Statement of Deputy United States Trade Representative John K. Veroneau regarding
U.S. Actions under GATS Article XXI, 4 May 2007 (www.ustr.gov).
88 In December 2007, the USTR confirmed that it had reached agreement with Canada, the
EU and Japan under the GATS Article XXI process. The United States agreed to liberalize
markets for warehousing services, technical testing, research and development services and
postal services relating to outbound international letters. USTR: Statement on Internet
Gambling, 21 December 2007 (www.ustr.gov).
89 The authorized retaliation is in the form of suspension of Antigua's obligations to protect US
intellectual property rights under the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS). See WTO Arbitration Award in US-Gambling, WT/DS285/
ARB, 21 December 2007.
90 The Accession Protocol is silent as to whether its terms may be amended. For detailed
analysis, see Qin, above n.7, at 133-135.
91 See Wu, above n.9, fn.55 (indicating that a proposal was made for China to follow suit with
US's non-compliance in US-Gambling).
92 The United States submitted no evidence on the adverse effect of the trading rights restric-
tions on trade. See above text to n.35. It remains to be seen how the amount of trade retalia-
tion will be calculated on the basis of the adverse effect of the measures on potential
importers.
93 Some content products, such as music, science and technology materials, are not so politically
sensitive. Given the small import quota on films, liberalizing the right to import films should
not make content review unmanageable.
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any deal between the two countries must be extended to all other WTO members
on a non-discriminatory basis.
III. New jurisprudence on trading rights
54. China-Publications has generated new jurisprudence on the interpretation of
China-specific rules within the WTO multilateral legal framework. This Section
will evaluate the new jurisprudence concerning (1) the applicability of GATT
Article XX to the Accession Protocol and (2) the trader-based necessity test under
GATT Article XX(a).
III.A. Applicability of GATT Article XX to the Accession Protocol
55. Technically, the Accession Protocol is a bilateral agreement concluded
between China and the WTO, distinct from the multilateral agreements con-
cluded among members of the WTO. At the same time, however, the Protocol
is also made an "integral part" of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization (the WTO Agreement), the umbrella agreement to which all other
multilateral WTO agreements are annexed.94 This dual status of the Accession
Protocol raises major issues for interpretation in that it is not clear how the
numerous China-specific obligations prescribed by the Accession Protocol
should be "integrated" with the generally applicable obligations under the multi-
lateral WTO agreements. 95 One such integration issue arose in this case-
whether the general exceptions of GATT Article XX are available to the
trading rights obligations under the Protocol-an issue of "broad systemic
import" for the WTO.9 6
56. As previously noted, the Appellate Body rejected the Panel's approach to
apply Article XX on an arguendo basis and instead tackled the systemic issue directly.
According to the AB, while the arguendo technique may enhance simplicity and effi-
ciency in decision-making, it may also detract from a clear enunciation of the rel-
evant WTO law and create difficulties for implementation. In the AB's view, the
use of the technique in this case "risks creating uncertainty with respect to
China's implementation obligations".
97
57. In addressing the question of applicability of Article XX to the Accession Pro-
tocol, the Appellate Body focused on the first two sentences of paragraph 5.1 of the
Accession Protocol, which sets out China's main commitment on trading rights98:
94 For discussion on the legal nature of the Protocol and its relationship with other WTO agree-
ments, see Qin, above n.7, at 132-138.
95 See id., 137.
96 Panel Report, para.7.739 (citing the view of the United States).
97 AB Report, paras.213-215.
98 The full scope of China's trading rights commitments is broader, see above n.10.
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Without prejudice to China s right to regulate trade in a manner consistent with
the WTO Agreement, China shall progressively liberalize the availability and
scope of the right to trade, so that, within three years after accession, all enter-
prises in China shall have the right to trade in all goods throughout the
customs territory of China, except for those goods listed in Annex 2A
which continue to be subject to state trading in accordance with this Protocol.
Such right to trade shall be the right to import and export goods. (Emphasis
added.)
58. China argued that the introductory clause of this paragraph (in italics above)
enables it to invoke GATT Article XX(a) to defend its measures at issue. The AB,
therefore, centred its interpretation on the meaning of the introductory clause.
After a lengthy discussion on the text and context of the introductory clause, the
AB concluded that whether China may justify its measure under Article XX
"must in each case depend on the relationship between the measure found to be
inconsistent with China's trading rights commitments, on the one hand, and
China's regulation of trade in goods, on the other hand."99 It then found "a
clearly discernible, objective link" between China's measures at issue and China's
regulation of trade in the relevant products. Based on this finding, the AB held
that China may rely on the introductory clause of paragraph 5.1 to invoke
GATT Article XX(a) to defend its measures found in violation of its trading
rights commitments under the Accession Protocol.' 0 0
III.A. i. A welcome development in W/TO jurisprudence
59. The AB's ruling is a significant development in WTO law in that it sanctions for
the first time the use of a general exception under one WTO agreement as a defence
for a claim made under another WTO agreement. For historical reasons, the WTO
treaty structure is exceedingly complex and the relationship between provisions of
different WTO agreements is not always clear. WTO rules on trade in goods, for
example, consist of GATT 1994, which includes the text of GATT 1947 and
various understandings on GATT provisions, and a dozen other WTO agreements,
such as the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM), the Anti-
dumping Agreement, and the Safeguard Agreement, that elaborate and expand the
original GATT disciplines. The relationship between the GATT and the other
instruments on trade in goods, however, is not well articulated by treaty language. 101
Among other things, it is unclear whether the general exceptions of the GATT can
99 AB Report, para.229.
100 AB, Report, paras.216-233.
101 The general interpretive note to Annex IA of the WTO Agreement provides a general prin-
ciple that, in the event of conflict between a provision of GATT 1994 and a provision of
another WTO agreement on trade in goods, the latter shall prevail.
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be invoked to defend claims made under other agreements that do not contain such
exceptions.
60. When the question arose previously as to whether GATT Article XX can be
invoked to justify a measure found to be inconsistent with the Antidumping Agree-
ment, the Appellate Body resorted to the arguendo technique and avoided answering
the question directly. 102 The AB's reluctance to address the systemic issue was con-
sistent with a strict textualist approach it adopted towards treaty interpretation.
Under this approach, the AB would follow the interpretive rules set out in Articles
31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) 103 in a rigid
and mechanical manner. Rather than placing a treaty term in its systemic context,
the AB would prefer to derive the meaning of the term from its dictionary defi-
nitions and narrow textual confines. The Appellate Body once declared that it
would not condone "the imputation into a treaty of words that are not there".
1 04
Accordingly, it was unwilling to find the applicability of GATT exceptions to
another WTO agreement without any textual indication in the treaty. In more
recent years, the AB has attempted to soften its strict approach, announcing that
treaty interpretation "is ultimately a holistic exercise".
10 5
61. Against this background, the AB's ruling on the availability of GATT Article
XX to the Accession Protocol is a welcome development in WTO jurisprudence.
Although the holding is closely pinned to the text of the introductory clause of para-
graph 5.1, which refers to the WTO Agreement, its legal reasoning is potentially
capable of a broader application. Specifically, the criterion announced by the AB
for the availability of the GATT exceptions is the existence of a "clearly discernible,
objective link" between the measures at issue and the regulation of trade in goods.' 0 6
Using this criterion, it should not be difficult to establish the availability of GATT
general exceptions to other WTO agreements regulating trade in goods, such as the
Antidumping Agreement and the SCM. Perhaps more significantly, the AB made a
general statement that the "right to regulate" is "an inherent power enjoyed by a
Member's government, rather than a right bestowed by international treaties such
as the WTO Agreement". 107 This recognition of a Member's inherent power to
regulate lends support to the argument that public policy exceptions such as
those set out in Article XX are "inherently" available to the Member to justify a
102 See above n.25.
103 Done at Vienna on 23 May 1969; entered into force on 27 January 1980. 1155 UNTS 331.
104 AB Report, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Pro-
ducts, AB/DS50/AB/R, adopted 16 January 1998, para.45.
105 AB Report, EC-Customs Classification for Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts, WT/269, 286/
AB/R, adopted 27 September 2005 (EC-Chicken Cuts), para.17 6 .
106 AB Report, paras.229- 233.
107 AB Report, para.222. It went on to say that such regulatory power in trade is constrained by
WTO disciplines prescribed by the WTO agreements. Id.
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derogation of a WTO obligation, and that the availability of such policy exceptions
can only be contracted away by explicit treaty provisions, and not by mere silence of
the treaty. 108
62. Hence, even though the AB's ruling is based on a textual link found in para-
graph 5.1 of the Accession Protocol, its reasoning may have opened the door for
applying GATT/GATS general exceptions to other WTO agreements that are
silent about such policy exceptions.109 Similarly, this reasoning could be used to
find the availability of GATT/GATS exceptions to other China-specific provisions
under the Accession Protocol that do not contain a similar qualifying clause as that
of paragraph 5.1.110 In short, the AB's analysis has paved the way for interpreting
the various agreements within the WTO as an integrated whole based on coherent
policy considerations.
63. Some may see the AB ruling as an indication of "judicial activism", insisting
that it is the WTO members, not its adjudicatory body, that should determine the
relationship between the various WTO agreements. Ideally, large gaps between trea-
ties should be filled by formal amendment or authoritative interpretations by the
WTO Members. However, in the light of the practical difficulties in securing
formal amendment or obtaining an authoritative interpretation from the
Members, 111 it would be unrealistic to expect the "legislative" branch of the
WTO to clarify the relationship between the various WTO agreements in the fore-
seeable future. For the sake of a better functioning of the WTO system, therefore,
the AB ruling is to be welcomed.
64. Others may harbour doubts as to the soundness of the AB ruling. They point
to the text of GATT Article XX, which states that "nothing in this Agreement" shall
prevent measures taken for the policy purposes set out therein. Since the Accession
Protocol is not part of the GATT, the argument goes, Article XX cannot be applied
108 For a similar understanding, see Pauwelyn, above n.9, at 18.
109 Pauwelyn also cautioned against opening the door too widely. Id., 19-20.
110 In an ongoing dispute, China has already asserted its inherent right to regulate under GATT
Article XX to justify the breach of its commitment to eliminate all export tariffs under the
Accession Protocol, despite that the provision setting out the commitment does not refer
to the WTO Agreement. See China-Measures related to the Exportation of Various Raw
Materials (DS394, DS395, DS398), U.S. Answers to the First Set of Panel Questions
(13 September 2010), Q. 35 (www.ustr.org).
111 To date, there has been only one amendment made to the WTO Agreement (Amendment to
the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/641 (8 December 2005)). The amendment has not yet taken
effect as it has not been accepted by two-thirds of the Members as required by Article X:3 of
the WTO Agreement. Pursuant to Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement, the Ministerial Con-
ference and the General Council have the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of the
WTO Agreement. However, no such authoritative interpretation has ever been made. See
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Lothar Ehring, The Authoritative Interpretation under
Article IX:2 of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization: Current Law,
Practice and Possible Improvements, 8 JIEL (2005), 803.
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to the Accession Protocol. This view seems widespread, including one expressed by
the EU as a third party in this case 112 and acknowledged by the Panel. 1 3 This
understanding, however, is completely mistaken. Legally, whether a GATT pro-
vision can or cannot be applied to another agreement is a matter to be decided
by the parties to that agreement, not the GATT. For instance, two countries that
are not members of the 'WTO could agree to apply GATT rules in their bilateral
trade relations; and the GATT (and its contracting parties) would have no say in
such an agreement. Likewise, whether GATT Article XX can be applied to
defend claims under the Accession Protocol is a matter of the intention of the
parties to the Accession Protocol (i.e. the WTO and China). The task of the
WTO judiciary is to ascertain such intention from the context of the Accession Pro-
tocol, not from the GATT provision itself. Hence, no issue of textual infidelity arises
in this respect.
IILA.ii. Interpretive flaws: an overlooked context in GATT
65. The significance of its decision notwithstanding, the AB's reasoning suffers from
some serious interpretive flaws. As explained below, these flaws appear to have
stemmed from the failure of the AB to identify the GAIT provisions on State
trading as the relevant context for the trading rights provisions of the Accession
Protocol.
IILA.ii.a. A logical error
66. The lynchpin of the AB's ruling is the introductory clause of paragraph 5.1 of
the Accession Protocol, which states that China's trading rights commitments are
"without prejudice to China's right to regulate trade in a manner consistent with
the WTO Agreement". According to the AB, China's measures at issue can be
WTO-consistent in one of two ways: (1) the measure is a type that the WTO Agree-
ment recognizes that Members may take; or (2) the measure meets the conditions of
a GATT exception, provided that it has "a clearly discernible, objective link" to the
regulation of trade in goods.i1 4 The AB did not explore the first possibility, focusing
on the second instead.' 15 Upon finding "a clearly discernible, objective link"
between China's measures and the regulation of trade in goods, the AB concluded
112 The EU stated that Article XX(a) does not directly apply to China's Accession Protocol
"because exceptions may be invoked only within the specific agreement in which they are
contained, and accession protocol commitments are not part of the GATT 1994." AB
Report, para. I11.
113 Panel Report, para.7.7 4 3 ("Article XX contains the phrase 'nothing in this Agreement', with
the term 'Agreement' referring to the GATT 1994, not other agreements like the Accession
Protocol.").
114 The AB Report, para.230.
115 The United States did not raise claims on trading rights under any WTO provisions other
than the Accession Protocol. See AB Report, fn.433.
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that China is entitled to invoke a GATT exception to justify its measures in
question.
67. There is, however, a problem in the AB's reasoning: China's measures at
issue-the various requirements of State trading and import monopoly in the cul-
tural sector-are, in fact, "a type that the WTO Agreement recognizes that Members
may take",'i 6 thus constituting the first way of being WTO-consistent as suggested
by the AB. That is because the WTO Agreement does not prohibit State trading and
import monopolies. As previously noted, liberalization of trading rights is a WTO-
plus obligation undertaken by a group of acceding Members only, and the scope of
such obligation varies from country to country. Under the generally applicable
WTO rules, Members remain free to establish and maintain State trading oper-
ations and import monopolies so long as they comply with the requirements set
out in GATT Article 11:4 (prohibiting monopolies from marking up prices for
imports) and Article XVII (imposing certain disciplines on State trading enter-
prises). Furthermore, GATT Article XX(d) permits a Member's measure necessary
for "the enforcement of monopolies" operated under Articles 11:4 and XVI. 1 17
68. Hence, it was erroneous for the Appellate Body to declare that China's
measures at issue can be WTO-consistent either as a type permitted by the WTO
Agreement or through an available exception. Because the trading rights commit-
ments are WTO-plus obligations, that is, obligations more stringent than those pre-
scribed by the generally applicable WTO rules, whether a measure in breach of such
commitments may be deemed as WTO-consistent cannot be determined, as a
matter of logic, by the generally applicable rules of the WTO Agreement. Simply
put, a breach of a WTO-plus rule is not a breach of ordinary WTO rules. Therefore,
the only way for the breach of a WTO-plus rule to be consistent with the WTO
Agreement is through an available exception.
69. It should be noted that this logical error is also embedded in the text of the
introductory clause of paragraph 5.1, which states that the trading rights commit-
ments are "without prejudice to China's right to regulate trade in a manner consist-
ent with the WTO Agreement". Since State trading monopolies are permitted
under the GATT, China's right to maintain such monopolies is necessarily
116 Here, the AB clearly did not mean for "the WTO Agreement" to include China's Accession
Protocol, which technically forms part of the WTO Agreement. For it would be circular to
include the Protocol in the "WTO Agreement" in the interpretation of the introductory
clause of paragraph 5.1 of the Protocol, which qualifies China's trading rights obligations
by preserving China's right to regulate in a manner consistent with the "WTO Agreement".
117 A GATT panel clarified that Article XX(d) "permits measures necessary to enforce the exclu-
sive possession of the trade by the monopoly, such as measures limiting private imports that
would undermine the control of the trade by the monopoly," but "does not permit contract-
ing parties to operate monopolies inconsistently with the other provisions of the General
Agreement." Panel Report, Japan-Restrictions on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products,
adopted 2 February 1988, GATT: Basic Instruments and Selected Documents (BISD) 35S/
163, 230, para.5.2.2.3. See also GATT Analytical Index (1994), Article XX, paragraph (d).
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prejudiced by its trading rights commitments."11 However, even though the
wording of the introductory clause is problematic, the AB could have avoided
falling into the trap if it had identified the State-trading provisions of the GATT
as the relevant context for the trading rights provisions of the Accession Protocol.
The failure to recognize the relevance of GATT Articles 11:4 and XVII in this
context not only contributed to the logical error in the AB's reasoning, but also
affected the AB's interpretation of the relationship between trade and traders
under the WTO Agreement, which underscores its decision on both the applica-
bility of GATT exceptions to the Accession Protocol and the necessity test under
GATT Article XX.
III.A. ii. b. The link between trade and traders
70. According to the AB, in order for the GATT exceptions to be available to the
trading rights provisions of the Accession Protocol, there must be "a clearly discern-
ible, objective link" between China's measures at issue, which regulate traders, and
its regulation of trade in goods. To ascertain whether such a link exists, the AB went
to great lengths to establish the connections between trade and traders under WTO
law. Firstly, it examined the relevant paragraphs of the Working Party Report ela-
borating China's trading rights commitments, which explicitly referred to the
WTO requirements concerning import licensing, and the TBT and SPS agree-
ments.1 19 Then, it observed that there is a "closely intertwined" relationship
between China's trading rights obligations and the obligations of all WTO
Members in respect of their regulation of trade in goods, and in particular, an
"interlinkage" between China's trading rights obligations and GATT Articles III
and XI 1 20 Next, it turned to GATT/WTO case law, citing a number of cases in
which measures not directly regulating trade were nonetheless found to contravene
GATT obligations, including restrictions imposed on investors, wholesalers and
manufacturers. 121 Upon further elaborations on how the link between the
measure regulating traders and the regulation of trade can be discerned, the AB
concluded:
118 To avoid this problem, the introductory clause would have to exclude from its coverage the
GATT provisions permitting State trading monopolies.
119 The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) and the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). AB Report, paras.22 4 - 2 2 5.
120 In this regard, the AB cited paragraph 80 of the Working Party Report, which records certain
Members' view that China's restrictions on trading rights were inconsistent with GATT
Articles 1II and XI. Paragraph 80 was not incorporated into the Accession Protocol, hence
is not legally binding. See AB Report, para.226, fn.430. Interestingly, the AB cited this
non-binding paragraph as reflecting the negotiating history of the trading rights
commitments.
121 AB Report, para.227, fn.432.
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Whether the necessary objective link exists in a specific case needs to be estab-
lished through careful scrutiny of the nature, design, structure, and function of
the measure, often in conjunction with an examination of the regulatory
context within which it is situated.
122
71. It is astonishing that the AB would go through such an elaborate route to find
a connection between trade and traders under WTO law, while completely ignoring
GATT Articles 11:4, XVII and XX(d), which explicitly regulate traders owned or
controlled by the State. From the very inception of the world trading system, the
GATT contracting parties had recognized that State trading enterprises could be
operated to "create serious obstacles to trade", and contemplated conducting
mutually advantageous negotiations to limit or reduce such obstacles. 123 Although
commitments to reduce State trading operations have rarely been made in the multi-
lateral trade negotiations, commitments to liberalize State trading have been sought
from the acceding members of the WTO, especially the former State trading
countries. 12 4 In this sense, the trading rights commitments of China are part of a
continuing effort of the Members to reduce potential barriers associated with
State trading operations. Viewed in this systemic context, it should become
crystal clear that there was no need for the Appellate Body to judicially establish
the link between China's measures and regulation of trade. The link between
trade and State-owned traders, the very subject in dispute, is firmly established by
the GATT provisions.
72. The AB's failure to recognize the GATT State-trading provisions as the rel-
evant context in this case is not without implications. By holding that the link
between a measure regulating traders and the regulation of trade "needs to be estab-
lished through careful scrutiny of the nature, design, structure, and function of the
measure" in the specific case, the AB has claimed the role of the final arbiter in
determining the existence of such a linkage. In contrast, if the GATT provisions
on State trading were recognized as the relevant context, the AB would have to
acknowledge the existence of such a linkage as dictated by the treaty language,
rather than as a result of the exercise of its interpretive power. Put differently, the
failure to recognize that the GATT provisions on State trading provide the relevant
context for China's trading rights commitments has given the WTO judiciary more
discretionary power in treaty interpretation than warranted by the treaty text.
122 Id., para.230.
123 GATT Article XVII:3, and Interpretive Note to Paragraph 3 of Article XVII.
124 See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, GATT Law on State Trading Enterprises: Critical Evaluation
of Article XVII and Proposals for Reform, in: Thomas Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis
(eds.), State Trading in the Twenty-First Century (University of Michigan Press, 1998),
71, 85.
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73. In addition, if the AB had identified GATT Articles 11:4 and XVII as the rel-
evant context, it could have established the applicability of GATTF Article XX to
China's trading rights obligations without having to rely exclusively on the illogical
language of the introductory clause of paragraph 5.1 of the Accession Protocol.
Viewed from a systemic perspective, Articles 11:4 and XVII provide the basic disci-
plines on State trading and import monopoly; and the trading rights commitments
prescribe more stringent disciplines on State trading and import monopoly. If
Article XX exceptions are available to the basic obligations under Article II:4 and
XVII, there is no reason why the same exceptions should not be made available
to the more stringent obligations on the same subject matter, unless the application
of such exceptions would defeat the very purpose of the more stringent obligations
or render such obligations meaningless.
125
III.B. The trader-based "necessity" test under GATT Article XX(a)
ILB. i. The trade versus trader dichotomy
74. As previously noted, when applying the necessity test under GATT Article
XX(a), the Panel added a separate "trader" factor to the existing interpretive
formula. 126 This addition is critical to the Panel's decision. Firstly, in the weighing
and balancing process, it was the consideration of the measures' severe impact on
potential traders, as opposed to their unclear impact on trade, that helped to tip
the balance against China. Secondly, in deciding whether there is a reasonably avail-
able alternative, the Panel considered alternatives that would have less restrictive
effect on importers, rather than on imports. Given the fact that the United States
did not submit evidence showing the measures' restrictive impact on imports, it
would have been very difficult to determine what might be a less trade-restrictive
alternative.
75. To justify the addition of trader-based considerations, the Panel analogized
the trading rights provisions of the Accession Protocol to GATT Article XI,
which prohibits quantitative restrictions on imports. The Panel stated:
In our view, if Article XX is assumed to be a direct defence for measures in
breach of trading rights commitments, it makes sense to consider how much
these measures restrict the right to import. This would appear to parallel a
situation where a member imposes a WTO-inconsistent ban on imports of
products and where an Article XX defence requires examination of how
much the ban restricts imports of those same products. Accordingly, we
125 It appears that the GATT Article XX(d) exception for domestic regulations relating to "the
enforcement of monopolies operated under paragraph 4 of Article 1I and Article XVII" will
be inappropriate for the trading rights obligations. Because the trading rights provisions gen-
erally prohibit import monopolies operated under Articles 11:4 and XVII, the exception
would render the trading rights obligations meaningless.
126 Above text to nn.36 and 37.
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find it appropriate to consider two different types of restrictive impact in this
case.127 (Emphasis added.)
76. The Panel's reasoning was upheld on appeal. According to the Appellate
Body:
The assessment of the restrictive effect to be taken into account in a particular
dispute may, in appropriate cases, extend beyond an assessment of the restric-
tive effect on imported products, as this assessment must be undertaken in the
light of the measure at issue, the specific obligation of the covered agreements
that the measure infringes, and the defence being invoked.
128
77. Thus, the WTO judiciary has created new jurisprudence under Article XX:
when applied to trading rights obligations, the "necessity" test may include an
assessment of the measure's restrictive effect on importers, as opposed to imported
products. What has emerged from this reasoning, therefore, is a trade versus trader
dichotomy under Article XX.
78. Notably, however, neither the Panel nor the AB provided a clear rationale for
their adoption of this trader-based effect test. The Panel simply stated that since
Article XX was invoked to defend a breach of the trading rights commitments,
"it makes sense" to consider how much the measures restricted the right to
import. While the Panel also stated that it saw a parallel between the trading
rights provisions of the Accession Protocol and GATT Article XI, it did not
explain why such a parallel should be assumed to exist. On appeal, the AB
merely deferred to the Panel's finding by declaring that, "in appropriate cases",
the assessment of the restrictive effect of the measures may extend beyond that on
imported products.
79. It appears that, in seeing a parallel between the trading rights provisions and
GATT Article XI, the WTO judges regarded the trading rights obligations as a new
discipline of the WTO, instead of an extension of the GATT disciplines on State
trading. Indeed, the trading rights provisions are qualitatively different from the
GATT rules on State trading, as they prohibit State trading monopolies, rather
than merely imposing conditions on them. This qualitative difference may well
warrant a different effect test under Article XX. Given that the necessity test is a cre-
ation of GATT/WTO case law, adapting it to new situations would be well within
the interpretive power of the WTO judiciary. 129 However, as a matter of legal
127 Panel Report, para.7.788 (footnote omitted).
128 AB Report, para.306. For the same reason, the AB rejected China's appeal on the less trader-
restrictive effect test. Id., paras.320-321.
129 The "necessity" test under Article XX was first articulated by the GATT panel in US-Section
337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, adopted 7 November 1989, BISD 36S/345. The test has con-
tinued to evolve under WTO case law, generating much literature on its jurisprudence. See,
e.g., Jan Neumann and Elisabeth Turk, Necessity Revisited: Proportionality in World Trade
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reasoning, why a different effect test is warranted in this particular context needs to
be explained. Unfortunately, neither the Panel nor the AB engaged in this level of
analysis.
IX.B. i.a. The object and purpose of the trading rights obligations
80. When Article XX is applied to defend measures in breach of the trading rights
obligations, its interpretation should be made in the light of the object and purpose
of such obligations. 130 Although the Accession Protocol does not articulate the
rationale for the trading rights provisions explicitly, it is evident that such obli-
gations were intended to compel China to reform its foreign trade regime. As
noted above, at the time of its WTO accession, the Chinese government still con-
trolled the allocation of trading rights. It was the subsequent implementation of the
trading rights obligations that finally rid China of its State-trading regime. Once
implemented, the trading rights obligations further prevent China from negating
the reform. Unlike other Members, who remain free to adopt any trading system
under international law, China cannot revert to a State-trading system or expand
State trading activities beyond the scope of its trading rights commitments
without incurring 'WTO consequences. In this sense, China has surrendered its
sovereign right to choose or modify its foreign trade regime. 13 1 It is fair to say, there-
fore, that the object and purpose of the trading rights obligations is to ensure that
China adopts and maintains a market-based foreign trade regime. Such an object
and purpose, however, need to be understood in the historical context of the
trading rights obligations.
Organization Law after Korea-Beef, EC-Asbestos and EC-Sardines, 37 Journal of World
Trade (2003), 199; Alan 0. Sykes, The Least Restrictive Means, 70 University of Chicago LR
(Winter 2003), 403; Donald H. Regan, The Meaning of "Necessary" in GATT Article XX
and GATS Article XIV: The Myth of Cost-Benefit Balancing, 6 World Trade Review
(2007), 347; Chad P. Bown and Joel P. Trachtman, Brazil-Measures Affecting Imports
of Retreaded Tyres: A Balancing Act, 8 World Trade Review (2009), 85; Benn McGrady,
Necessity Exceptions in WTO Law: Retreaded Tyres, Regulatory Purpose and Cumulative
Regulatory Measures, 12 JIEL (2009), 153. For a latest critique, see Gisele Kapterian, A Cri-
tique of the WTO Jurisprudence on "Necessity", 59 ICLQ (2010), 89-127 (criticizing the
necessity test, as currently applied by the WTO judiciary, as unsupported by the treaty text
and overly intrusive into regulatory autonomy of the Members).
130 Although Article 31 of the VCLT refers to the "object and purpose" of a treaty as a whole,
WTO adjudicators have routinely examined the "object and purpose" of particular treaty
provisions. According to the AB, Article 31 does not exclude taking into account the
object and purpose of particular treaty terms, "if doing so assists the interpreter in determin-
ing the treaty's object and purpose as a whole." It also cautioned against considering the
object and purpose of particular treaty terms in isolation from the object and purpose of
the treaty on the whole. AB Report, EC-Chicken Cuts, paras.238- 2 39.
131 For the Constitutional implications of such systemic commitments, see Julia Ya Qin, The
Impact of WTO Accession on China's Legal System: Trade, Investment and Beyond,
Wayne State University Law School Research Paper Series, No. 07-15 (papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=985321).
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81. Historically, under the GATIT, the world trading system did not require its
members to be equipped with a market-based trading regime. Even though its
rules were based on market economy assumptions, the GATT was supposed to
be ideologically neutral to its members' choices of economic systems and to find
ways to bridge the differences between them. 132 Thus, the GATT recognizes the
legitimacy of State trading and State import monopoly, while imposing certain con-
ditions on their operations so as to prevent potential abuse. In order to accommo-
date a number of centrally planned economies joining the GATT, the trading system
fashioned special rules, such as import commitments and special safeguards, when
the regular GATT rules were considered inadequate to regulate the behaviour of full-
scale State trading regimes.
133
82. This approach changed after the end of the Cold War, when the communist
regimes in the former Soviet bloc collapsed and most of the central-planning econ-
omies began to reform their systems according to market economy principles. 13 4 By
the time the WTO was established, there were no longer two competing economic
systems (planned versus market), and economic ideologies had converged on the
faith of free market.1 3 5 Hence, the former planned-economies became known as
"transition economies", or countries "in the process of transformation from a cen-
trally-planned into a market, free enterprise, economy"1.136 When these countries
applied to join the WTO, the world trading system began to demand that they
undertake the marketization of their economies. Liberalization of trading rights
was one such undertaking. Armed with free market convictions, the WTO has
also sought pro-market reforms including trading rights commitments from all
other acceding countries. 137
83. This paradigm shift in the accession policy. coincided with the major expan-
sion of the world trading system following the Uruguay Round. 138 Concluded in
1993, the Uruguay Round agreements extended the reach of international trade
regulation to many areas that were traditionally domestic regulatory domains,
including trade in services, protection of intellectual property rights, investment,
domestic subsidies and health and safety standards. Institutionally, with the
132 For an excellent description of this historical approach, see Chieh Huang, Non-Market Econ-
omies' Accession to the WTO: Evolution of the Approach and Implications for the Organ-
ization, 4 The Hague Journal of Diplomacy (2009), 61.
133 Id. For a detailed treatment of the subject, see Michel M. Kostecki, East-West Trade and the
GATT System (New York: St Martin's, 1979).
134 See Huang, above n.132, at 72.
135 Id., 73-74.
136 SCM, art. 29.
137 See WTO Secretariat, above n. 6 . For example, Saudi Arabia undertook that, upon accession,
it would grant the right to import to foreign firms and individuals with no commercial pres-
ence in Saudi Arabia, and to amend its laws to fulfil this commitment. Id., 36.
138 See Huang, above n.132, 72-73.
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establishment of the WTO, a more powerful dispute settlement mechanism was put
into place to ensure effective enforcement of WTO rules. This significant expansion
in international governance inevitably reduces the domestic policy space of WTO
members. 13 9 Previously, under the GATT, the system was solely concerned with
trade liberalization, and its interference with domestic regulation was limited essen-
tially to the requirement of non-discrimination between imported products and
domestically-produced like products. In contrast, the WTO has mandated certain
international standards for domestic regulations, such as the standards for IP protec-
tion and health and technical regulations, which promote convergence of domestic
governance norms irrespective of their effect on trade liberalization. Consequently,
the WTO adjudicatory body is empowered to engage in more intrusive reviews and
may strike down domestic regulations that do not conform to those standards even if
they are not discriminatory or protectionist in design.140 Reflecting a deeper inte-
gration of the world economy, the expansion of WTO governance was also
guided by the economic ideology of free market 14 1 that propelled the paradigm
shift in WTO's accession policy.
84. Of all the transition economies that have acceded to the WTO, China faced
the most challenges in meeting the demands of the WTO. Unlike 'the East Euro-
pean countries, China never embraced a full-scale privatization of its economy
and the Communist Party never lost control. Instead, the Party has led an economic
reform that combines market mechanisms with government commands, and fosters
private ownership while maintaining dominant State ownership in sectors deemed
strategic to the nation. Given this "incomplete" conversion to the prototypical
market economy, the WTO accession requirements on market-based reforms
were more demanding for China to implement. Take the trading rights
139 Jeffrey Dunoff questioned whether WTO disciplines in each of the new areas are really about
the potential restructuring of domestic regulatory and legal systems embedded in the insti-
tutional infrastructure of the economy. Jeffrey Dunoff, Lotus Eaters: Reflection on the Var-
ietals Dispute, the SPS Agreement and WTO Dispute Resolution, in: George A. Bermann
and Petros C. Mavroidis (eds.), Trade and Human Health and Safety (Cambridge University
Press, 2006), 153, 173.
140 Two representative cases of this line decided under the SPS and the TBT, respectively, are:
AB Report, EC-Measures concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/
AB/R; WT/DS48/AB/R, 16 January 1998; AB Report, EC-Trade Description of
Sardines, WT/DS231/AB/R, 26 November 2002. See Henrik Horn and Joseph Weiler,
European Communities-Trade Description of Sardines: Textualism and Its Discontent,
in: Henrik Horn and Petros C. Mavroidis (eds.), The WTO Case Law of 2002 (Cambridge
University Press 2005), 248, 251 (indicating the TBT and SPS standards represent as big a
paradigm shift to international economic law as the prohibition on the use of force in the
classical world of international law).
141 See Robert Howse and Kalypso Nicolaidis, Enhancing WTO Legitimacy: Constitutionalism
or Global Subsidiarity? 16 Governance (2003), 73 (pointing out that the spirit in which the
Uruguay Round rules were made reflected "over-enthusiasm for economic liberal ideology,
not mere free trade, as the basic economic objective of the system.").
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commitments as an example. The East European countries merely needed to
"confirm" that they already liberalized trading rights,' 4 2 whereas China had to
make a major overhaul of its then-existing system. In this sense, China's undertak-
ings are the most aggressive of all WTO obligations in terms of their effect on dom-
estic policy and institution.
II.B. i. b. The mission question
85. Knowing that the purpose of the trading rights obligations is to ensure a market-
based trading system in China is not the end of the inquiry. A further question needs
to be asked as to why such a system is desired by the WTO. Is it because a market-
based system is more conducive to achieving the goal of liberal trade, or is it because
a market economy is in itself a value of the WTO? This is a question about the
mission or the objective of the WTO. The answer to this question is key to under-
standing the implications of the trade versus trader dichotomy adopted by the WTO
judiciary under Article XX.
86. Presumably, if one sees the reason for requiring market-based reforms in
China as ultimately to promote free trade-the mission of the WTO as convention-
ally understood (the conventional trade model)-one will not find the need for a
trader-based necessity test in the application of Article XX, since the ultimate
purpose of the trading rights obligations is the same as that of the GATT obli-
gations. Under this vision, the trading rights commitments would be understood
as the extension of existing GATT disciplines on State trading. They were needed
because the existing GATT rules were considered insufficient to address the issue
of potential non-tariff barriers arising from the extensive State trading activities
that remained in China at the time of its accession. Consistent with this view, the
GATT general exceptions would be available to the trading rights obligations,
just as they are available to the obligations prescribed by GATT Articles 11:4 and
XVIIJ 43 In applying the general exceptions, the same necessity test under Article
XX would be used, under which whether the measures at issue are protectionist
in design and whether they have a major trade-restrictive effect would be important
considerations. In this case, since China's measures are clearly maintained for pol-
itical reasons and since no major trade-restrictive effect of the measures has been
detected, the use of the conventional necessity test might well lead to the conclusion
that China's measures could be excused by Article XX(a).
87. In contrast, if one views the reason for requiring systemic reforms in China as
promoting free market as a value in itself, then one may perceive the WTO as having
a different mission. Instead of being concerned with mere trade liberalization, the
142 See, e.g., trading rights commitments of Armenia, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Estonia, Georgia,
Albania, Croatia, Lithuania, Moldova and FYROM. WTO Secretariat, above n.6, 31-37.
143 Unless the application of the GATT exceptions would render the trading rights obligations
meaningless, see above n.125.
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WTO is also concerned with setting "correct" norms for domestic economic gov-
ernance, irrespective of the direct impact of such norms on international trade
(the domestic governance model). Under this vision, the trading rights obligations
would be understood as a separate discipline from the GATT disciplines on State
trading, addressing concerns beyond State trading being potential non-tariff bar-
riers. 144 In accordance with this understanding, whether a measure violating the
trading rights obligations can be excused by Article XX would not depend on the
finding of protectionist intent and trade-restrictive effect. Rather, the legality of
the measure would be examined against its impact on the systemic reform. To
that end, the use of a trader-based necessity test would be warranted.
88. Although the Panel and the AB did not discuss the trading rights obligations
by reference to the objectives of the WVTO, their interpretation appears to reflect a
vision that corresponds to the domestic governance model. Consistent with this
model, they treated the trading rights obligations as a new discipline parallel to
the discipline under GATT Article XI, rather than as an extension of GATT disci-
plines on State trading, and devised a trader-based necessity test for scrutinizing the
measures under Article XX.
89. On the other hand, there appears to be an assumption underlying the Panel
and AB interpretations that restrictions on trading rights would necessarily have an
adverse effect on trade. Thus, while acknowledging the fact that cultural imports
into China had increased over time, the Panel also noted: "this increase did not
necessarily indicate that China's measures had not had any trade-restrictive effect,
because the statistics did not indicate what import levels might have been if the
measures had not been imposed."' 145 In endorsing the US proposal that the
Chinese government conduct content review itself, the Panel stated that the US pro-
posal would not result in any restriction on the right to import, and "would thus not
produce any of the adverse effects on imports which the restriction of the right to
trade would produce." 146 These statements seem to indicate that the Panel
viewed the purpose of the trading rights obligations as ultimately to promote
liberal trade, rather than pushing the reform agenda in China's domestic system,
a vision that is consistent with the conventional trade model. Since neither the
Panel nor the AB engaged in discussion on the object and purpose of the trading
rights obligations and their connection to the objectives of the WTO, we are left
in the dark as to the true rationale for the trader-based necessity test.
90. It should be noted, however, that the Panel's assumption that the restriction
of the right to import would necessarily produce adverse effects on imports is
144 The fact that China agreed to grant trading rights to "all enterprises in China"-effectively
privatizing all foreign trade activities except for a limited number of products-seems to
support this understanding. See Accession Protocol, para.5.1; WPR, para.84(a).
145 AB Report, para.300 (summarizing the Panel's finding in this regard).
146 Panel Report, para.7.892.
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flawed. In theory, exclusive State trading may result in over-import as well as under-
import, as compared to the import level set by a fully competitive marketplace.'
4 7
Over-import may occur if the State trading firms receive subsidies from the govern-
ment or otherwise act according to government instructions. Given that China's
State trading in cultural products is maintained for political reasons, liberalization
would not necessarily lead to increased imports. Conversely, a restructured
content review system as proposed by the WTO judiciary might well result in a
reduced volume of imports as it could create an expanded bureaucracy and otherwise
produce a chilling effect on imports.148
III.B. i. c. Assessing the trader-restrictive effect under Article XX
91. If we view the trading rights obligations as qualitatively different from GATT
obligations, the WTO judiciary should have considerable discretion in fashioning
new criteria under Article XX for assessing a measure's trader-restrictive effect.
Depending on the chosen level of scrutiny, a treaty interpreter may assess the restric-
tive effect of the measure differently. For example, in the light of the object and
purpose of the trading rights obligations, the treaty interpreter may consider it
appropriate to examine the restrictive impact of the measures on China's foreign
trade regime as a whole. Since China has liberalized trading rights in all sectors
except the cultural sector, he may find that the measures do not have a significant
impact on the systemic reform as intended by the trading rights obligations.
Hence, when the trader-restrictive effect is assessed against the overall objective of
the trading rights obligations, the result of the balancing under Article XX(a)
could tilt in favour of China.
92. Alternatively, the treaty interpreter may choose to scrutinize China's measures
more strictly, focusing on the measures' impact on the cultural sector exclusively.
Since the measures have prevented liberalization of trading rights in the entire cul-
tural sector, the treaty interpreter would find the trader-restrictive effect of the
measures complete. This is effectively the approach taken by the Panel and the
AB, even though it is unclear whether the judges were guided by the goal of deepen-
ing systemic reform in China. By taking this approach, the WTO judiciary assumed
the role of arbiter in deciding what the proper scope of China's systemic reform
should be.
IIIB. ii. The "less trader-restrictive" alternative
93. With all the weighing and balancing, the ultimate test for "necessity" under
Article XX has always been the less trade-restrictive means available. In the words
of the Appellate Body, the result of weighing and balancing "must be confirmed
147 In practice, because of the lack of transparency in state trading operations, it may not be poss-
ible to know what import levels would be in a privatized trading market.
148 See Section II.C.
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by comparing the measure with possible alternatives, which may be less trade restric-
tive while providing an equivalent contribution to the achievement of the
[measure's] objective." 149 The less trade-restrictive alternative must be "reasonably
available", but potential incurrence of higher administrative costs does not disqualify
an alternative as a reasonably available one. 150 In deciding whether such an alterna-
tive exists, the WTO judiciary has considerable discretion. Critics have observed that
there is a potential danger of the test being used in a manner that compromises or
rejects the Member's chosen level of protection. 151
94. Adapting the test to trading rights, the Panel looked for alternatives that are
less trader-restrictive. It found such an alternative in the US proposal that the
Chinese government be given the sole responsibility for conducting content
review. Since the government sets the review standards and has control over qualified
reviewers, the Panel concluded that the proposed alternative would make "an equiv-
alent or better contribution to the realization of the objective of protecting public
morals", while having a significantly less restrictive impact on potential
importers. 1
52
95. The logic of the Panel's reasoning seems impeccable. On appeal, China
merely contested the reasonable availability of the proposed alternative, not its
level of contribution to the stated objective. 153 However, the Panel's reasoning
did not take into account the desire of the Party to keep its censorship criteria
secret and unpredictable. As previously explained, the secrecy and unpredictability
of the censorship criteria provide the Party with a maximum degree of flexibility
so that it can easily adjust them according to the perceived danger of the day.
Should such a desire be considered a level of protection sought by the Chinese gov-
ernment? If so, then State trading, with its inherent opacity, is undoubtedly the
most effective means to achieve that goal. In comparison, the proposed alternative,
by allowing any number of private entities to become importers, could force the
government to make the censorship criteria and process more transparent,
thereby undermining the desired level of protection. But since China did not
149 AB Report, Brazil-Tyres, para.178.
150 An alternative may be found not to be "reasonably available" where it is merely theoretical in
nature, or where it imposes an undue burden, such as "prohibitive costs or substantial tech-
nical difficulties", on the responding party. AB Report, para.310 (quoting AB Report, US-
Gambling, para.308).
151 See Kapterian, above n.129, at 125-126 (pointing out that ifa challenged measure is instru-
mental to the achievement of its goal, it is difficult to see how an alternative with less impact
on trade could achieve the same level of protection sought by the Member).
152 Panel Report, para.7.899.
153 China argued that the proposed alternative would impose an undue financial and adminis-
trative burden on China. The AB was not persuaded, faulting China for failing to provide
evidence "substantiating the likely nature or magnitude of the costs that would be associated
with the proposed alternative, as compared to the current system". AB Report, para.328.
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make this argument (it would have been unseemly to advocate the need to maintain
a non-transparent censorship regime), the Panel did not have to consider the unspo-
ken rationale of China's measures. One wonders, however, whether all the parties
involved in the WTO litigation were aware of this unspoken rationale.1
54
III.C. Another overlooked treaty context: the Vietnam accession protocol
96. Like China, Vietnam undertook to liberalize trading rights when it acceded to
the WTO in 2007.155 Also like China, Vietnam had engaged in market-oriented
economic reforms but maintained a significant State sector at the time of its acces-
sion. Unlike China, however, Vietnam explicitly excluded from its trading rights
commitments the right to import certain cultural products. 156 More significantly,
"society morals" was identified as the rationale for such exclusion under the
Vietnam accession protocol. 15 7 Presumably, "society morals" is not a different
concept from "public morals". 158 Taken at face value, therefore, the Vietnam acces-
sion protocol recognizes the protection of society/public morals as the justification
for State import monopoly in certain cultural products.
97. If this understanding is correct, then a potential inconsistency arises in WTO
law. On the one hand, the WTO Agreement, of which both the China Accession
Protocol and the Vietnam accession protocol form "an integral part", 159 has
accepted categorically that State import monopoly in cultural products can be
154 It is unclear to what extent China's litigation strategy and legal arguments were formulated by
the foreign law firm representing China in this case, and whether the foreign lawyers involved
understood the real rationale of China's measures. But if China had made the argument, the
United States could probably have challenged the rationale under the transparency require-
ments of the WTO Agreement and the Accession Protocol. See above n.69.
155 Vietnam undertook that from the date of accession, all foreign firms and individuals would
be able to engage in importation and exportation of products, except for the list of products
reserved for exclusive state trading under Table 8(c). See Report of the Working Party on the
Accession of Viet Nam, WT/ACC/VNM/48 (27 October 2006) ("Vietnam Working Party
Report"), para. 146, which was incorporated into the Protocol on the Accession of the Social-
ist Republic of Viet Nam, WT/ACC/VNM/48 (27 October 2006).
156 Such cultural products include: "Newspapers, journals and periodicals", covering subcate-
gories of "scientific, technical or economic"; and "records, tapes and other recorded media
for sound" covering cinematographic film, videotape and others. For products under each
category, a state trading enterprise is designated as the sole importer and wholesale distribu-
tor. See Vietnam Working Party Report, para.72, and Tables 5 and 8(c).
157 Table 8(c) contains a column titled "Rationale", which sets out briefly the reason for each
category of products reserved for exclusive state trading. The rationale column for the cultural
products reads: "Cultural products affecting to [sic] society morals". Id. No further expla-
nation provided.
158 Interestingly, the term "public morals" is used in Table 8(a) of the Vietnam Working Party
Report, which sets out several categories of cultural products, including motion pictures and
various printed matters, the state trading of which was to be liberalized by 1 January 2009,
and identifies the rationale for such delayed liberalization to be "sensitive to public morals".
159 Vietnam accession protocol, para.2.
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justified by the reason of society morals; on the other, the WTO judiciary has held
that, in the case of China, State import monopoly in cultural products cannot be
justified by reason of public morals so long as there is a less trader-restrictive alterna-
tive available. While the WTO dispute settlement decision is binding on the parties
to the dispute only, the legal interpretation embodied in adopted panel and Appel-
late Body reports becomes "part and parcel of the acquis of the WTO dispute settle-
ment system" and is expected to be followed in subsequent cases.
60
98. One might argue that the two cases are totally different because Vietnam
negotiated a clear exception for State trading in cultural products, which became
part of the bargain accepted by the WTO, whereas China failed to do so and
merely attempted to justify its violation of the trading rights commitments post
hoc. 16 1 It is true that if China had negotiated an explicit exception for cultural pro-
ducts during its accession, the United States probably would not have challenged
China's measures in the first place. However, as a matter of WTO law, should
the standard for the same policy exception to trading rights obligations vary depend-
ing on whether the exception is explicitly set out in the treaty text or is interpreted by
the WTO judiciary? Or, if we are to assume there is a uniform standard, does it
mean Vietnam's State import monopoly in cultural products is now open to chal-
lenge under the trader-based necessity test?
99. The issue raised here is again a systemic one: do one Member's accession com-
mitments constitute a relevant treaty context for the purpose of interpreting the
accession commitments of another Member? Formally, since all accession protocols
have been made an integral part of the WTO Agreement, they constitute "context"
for each other as part of the "text" of the same treaty under Article 31 of the
VCLT. 162 The question is whether they are "relevant" treaty contexts for each
other. It is submitted here that the answer should be positive so long as the commit-
ments at issue belong to the same category and reflect the same policy consider-
ations. Take the trading rights commitments as an example. Although these
commitments are country-specific, negotiated at different points in time and
varying in scope and content, they fall under the same category of accession
160 AB Report, United States-Final Antidumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico,
WT/DS344/AB/R, adopted 20 May 2008, para.160. For reasons of ensuring "security
and predictability" in the dispute settlement system, "absent cogent reasons, an adjudicatory
body will resolve the same legal question in the same way in a subsequent case." Id.
161 It is unclear whether Vietnam explicitly excluded cultural products because it became aware
of the issue from China's experience. The United States raised the issue of trading rights in
China's cultural sector within the WTO in 2005, one year before Vietnam finalized its acces-
sion protocol. See WTO Transitional Review Mechanism Pursuant to Paragraph 18 of the
Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China, Questions from the United
States to China, G/C/W/530 (12 October 2005).
162 Article 31(2) of the VCLT provides: "The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a
treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes... ".
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obligations sought by the WTO and share the same policy rationale. 163 In this
regard, the individual accession commitments are rather similar to the market
access commitments under GATT and GATS schedules. Like the market access
commitments, the accession commitments are made by one Member, but form
an integral part of the WTO Agreement. It has been well settled under WTO
law that with respect to one Member's schedule under GATF or GATS, other
Members' schedules constitute relevant context for its interpretation. 164 Accord-
ingly, the accepted rationale for Vietnam's State import monopoly in cultural pro-
ducts should at least be consulted as part of a broader context for the interpretation
of China's trading rights commitments under Article XX(a). In the event that the
\WTO judges wish to reject the relevance of the rationale in the Vietnam accession
protocol, they should be expected to provide a reasoned explanation. Unfortunately,
this issue has been completely overlooked.
III.D. The issue of common intention
100. It is well established that the purpose of treaty interpretation is "to ascertain the
common intentions of the parties."1 65 Given that the Accession Protocol is techni-
cally a bilateral agreement between China and the WTO, the task of the WTO judi-
ciary in this case was to determine the common intention between China, on the
one hand, and the WTO (on behalf of all other Members collectively), on the
other. 166 By definition, such "common" intention cannot be China's intention
alone, but it cannot be without China's intention either. 167 Put differently,
absent China's intention, there would be no "common" intention to speak of
with respect to its trading rights commitments.
163 See above text to nn.132-137.
164 See AB Report, EC-Chicken Cuts, para.193 (stating that the "broader context" of the
term "salt" in the EC's schedule include other Members' goods schedules); AB Report,
US-Gambling, para.182 (agreeing that other Members' schedules constitute relevant
context for the interpretation of the US service schedule, with the caution that use of
other Members' schedules must be tempered with the recognition that each schedule
has its own intrinsic logic).
165 AB Report, European Communities-Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equip-
ment, WT/DS62, 67, 68/AB/R, adopted 22 June 1998 (EC-Computer Equipment),
para.84.
166 Conceptually, when the treaty is between China, on the one hand, and the WTO as an inter-
national organization, on the other, the intention of the WTO should be the collective inten-
tion of all WTO members excluding China. The bilateral character of the Accession Protocol,
however, has never been discussed in WTO cases. See Qin, above n.7, 132-138.
167 Curiously, the AB seems to have overlooked this basic point when it stated: "We further note
that the purpose of treaty interpretation under Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention
is to ascertain the 'common intention' of the parties, not China's intention alone." AB
Report, para. 4 05.
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101. The common intention of the parties cannot be ascertained on the basis of
"subjective and unilaterally determined" expectations of one party. 168 Instead, it has
to be identified objectively through proper application of the interpretive rules of the
VCLT.16 9 Under these rules, the text must be presumed to be an authentic
expression of the intention of the parties. 170 If the text, when read in its context
and in the light of the object and purpose of the treaty, is ambiguous, recourse to
extraneous evidence may be had, including the preparatory work of the treaty and
the circumstances of its conclusion.
171
102. It is clear that the Chinese government never intended to liberalize the right
to import in the cultural sector. The absence of such intention can be readily
observed from the consistency and firmness with which the relevant Chinese law
and policy has been carried out throughout the era of economic reforms, and
from the political rationale of such law and policy. It should come as no surprise,
therefore, that the United States did not provide evidence suggesting that China
had once contemplated liberalizing the right to import cultural products. Nor
was there any indication that this particular aspect of the trading rights was ever dis-
cussed during China's accession negotiations. As noted above, China's neglect in
excluding cultural products from its trading rights commitments explicitly can be
explained by a mentality that took for granted the State control in the cultural
sector. In execution, it was also attributable to the lack of experience and coordi-
nation among different government agencies that were in charge of approving the
thousands of concessions China made during the accession negotiations. Hence,
if the United States had actually held a different expectation from China's
trading rights commitments, such an expectation would be just as "subjective and
unilaterally determined" as China's expectation, and cannot serve as the basis for
ascertaining the "common intention" between China and the WTO.
103. The issue of common intention concerning trading rights, however, was not
discussed at all in the Panel and AB reports. This contrasts sharply with the parts of
the Panel and AB reports dealing with GATS issues, in which the WTO judges
examined the "common intention" behind China's commitment on "sound record-
ing distribution services" (whether it was intended to cover electronic distribution)
by going through each element of Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT-ordinary
meaning of words, context, object and purpose, preparatory work and the circum-
stances of the conclusion of the Accession Protocol, including China's domestic law
168 AB Report, EC-Computer Equipment, para.84.
169 Richard Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford University Press, 2008), 6 (ascertainment
of intention is one consequence of the excise if the Vienna rules are properly applied).
170 Id. (quoting the Commentary of the International Law Commission (ILC), which
accompanied its draft articles for the 1968-1969 Vienna Conference at which the text of
the VCLT was adopted).
171 VCLT arts. 31 and 32.
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and practice. 172 In contrast, the WTO judges did not follow this interpretive format
in their analyses of the trading rights provisions. While the text of the trading rights
provisions and part of their treaty context was examined, their object and purpose
was barely mentioned, and no reference was made to the preparatory work or the
circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the Accession Protocol.
173
104. It is unclear why the WTO judges pursued such different interpretive
approaches in the two parts of the same reports. After all, both the trading rights
commitments and the market access commitments under GATS are specific "con-
cessions" made by China, and the issue in both contexts was the scope of the con-
cession. If the text of the trading rights provisions were clear, there would be no need
to resort to extraneous evidence to ascertain common intention. But the text of the
trading rights provisions is not free from ambiguity-the introductory phrase of
paragraph 5.1, which qualifies the scope of China's trading rights obligations,
requires interpretation. Once the GATT general exceptions are read into the intro-
ductory phrase, the question becomes whether there was common intention among
WTO members to permit possible exclusion of cultural products from trading
rights commitments on the ground of protecting public morals. Judging from Viet-
nam's experience, such a common intention may well exist. 174 Had the issue been
raised in this context, the parties might have had a chance to submit evidence
showing the existence of the common intention, or the lack thereof, to liberalize
trading rights in China's cultural sector.175
105. The fact remains that, despite the lack of "common intention" to liberalize
trading rights in China's cultural sector, the WTO judiciary has concluded other-
wise. This result raises a fundamental question in treaty interpretation: Why
could the tension between "text" and "intent" not be resolved through the appli-
cation of the VCLT rules?17 6 Is it because the VCLT rules are so rigid that their
application necessarily dictated the disregard of the intent? Or is it because the
rules were not applied properly? To better understand the issue, it would be
helpful to consider these additional questions: (i) Is the text of the trading rights
provisions so clear as to eliminate the need for recourse to supplemental means of
172 See Panel Report, paras.7.1172-7.12 6 4 (of which paras.7.124 4 -7.12 4 6 examined the cir-
cumstances of the conclusion of the Accession Protocol as reflected in China's domestic
law and practice at the time); AB Report, paras.3 4 8 -411.
173 See Section III.E.i.
174 See Section III.C.
175 It is interesting to contemplate how such evidence might have affected the interpretation of
Article XX(a), including its necessity test, since consideration of such evidence would not fit
into the existing interpretive formula for Article XX.
176 In drafting the VCLT interpretive rules, the ILC considered three general approaches: (i)
literal, (ii) teleological and (iii) intention. The ILC adopted a combination of the literal
and teleological approaches, viewing application of these as yielding up the intention. Gar-
diner, above n.169, 8.
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interpretation, as instructed by Article 32 of the VCLT? (ii) If the text is not so clear,
why was the recourse to supplemental means not made? (iii) If recourse to sup-
plemental means should have been had, how should extraneous evidence, such as
consistent China law and practice, and the historical background against which
the Accession Protocol was negotiated, 177 be considered in the context of applying
Article XX(a) to the trading rights provisions?
106. Ultimately, treaty interpretation is an art, not science.178 In practising that
art, the WTO judiciary should be able to apply the VCLT rules in a way that will
reconcile any divergence between the treaty text and clear intentions of the parties,
as ascertained objectively from the particular circumstances of each case. As the
Appellate Body once declared:
The ordinary meaning of a treaty term must be ascertained according to the
particular circumstances of each case. Importantly, the ordinary meaning of
a treaty term must be seen in the light of the intention of the parties "as
expressed in the words used by them against the light of the surrounding
circumstances." 179 (Emphasis added.)
107. The problem in this instance, however, is that no proper effort was made to
identify such circumstances and to determine against the light of such circumstances
whether the relevant common intention did exist.
III.E. Identifying the sources of the interpretive problems
II. E i. Deficiencies in the Accession Protocol
108. In interpreting the WTO agreements, panels and the AB typically analyse the
treaty text in question by examining each element of Articles 31 and 32 of the
VCLT-firstly, the ordinary meaning of the treaty term, then the context and
the object and purpose, and finally the supplementary means of interpretation.
This interpretive format, however, cannot be easily applied in the context of the
Accession Protocol. Unlike the WTO multilateral agreements, each of which
contains a coherent set of generally applicable disciplines, the Accession Protocol
prescribes China-specific rules that address subject matters across various WTO
agreements. Yet, the Accession Protocol, which forms part of the WTO Agreement,
177 In the context of interpreting market access commitments under GATT schedules, the AB
has construed "the circumstances" of the treaty's conclusion, as referred to in Article 32 of
the VCLT, very broadly so they may include the historical background against which the
treaty was negotiated, prior consistent practice of one party, unilateral acts and statements,
subsequent practice of one party and domestic legislative acts and court decisions. See AB
Report, EC-Computer Equipment, paras.86, 92-95; AB Report, EC-Chicken Cuts,
paras.289, 305, 308-309.
178 Gardiner, above n.169, 5, 7.
179 AB Report, EC-Chicken Cuts, para.175 (quoting Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties
(Oxford Clarendon Press, 1961), 365).
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does not always specify how the China-specific rules relate to the generally appli-
cable WTO provisions. Consequently, it can be difficult to identify the relevant
"context" of a particular provision of the Protocol. Furthermore, the Protocol
does not provide explanations on why the many China-specific rules are needed,
which makes it harder to identify the object and purpose of such provisions. 180
While the overall purpose of the Accession Protocol is obviously to integrate
China into the WTO system (or "allowing the WTO and China to establish, by
mutual agreement, the terms under which China could accede to the WTO"'8i),
this general objective sheds little light on the rationale of the specific Protocol pro-
visions. In addition, the negotiation records for the Accession Protocol have not
been made publicly available, depriving the treaty interpreter of a major supplemen-
tary means of interpretation.
109. The deficiencies in the Accession Protocol have left visible marks in the
Panel and AB reports. As noted above, the WTO judges did not follow the
normal interpretive format in their interpretation of the trading rights provisions.
After discussing the ordinary meaning of the treaty terms, the Panel and the AB
did not go through all the elements constituting the "context" as defined by the
VCLT. And there was no mention of the object and purpose of the trading rights
provisions; nor was there any reference to the supplementary means of interpret-
ation, such as the preparatory work and the circumstances of the Protocol's con-
clusion. Once the discussion moved to the section dealing with GATS issues, in
contrast, the Panel and the AB resumed their usual format of interpretation. One
can find subsections in the GATS part of the reports clearly labelled by each
element of Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT.
182
110. This change in the interpretive format is not merely a matter of style. Rather,
it reflects the difficulties the WTO judges encountered with a strict textualist
approach to treaty interpretation. Given the deficiencies of the Accession Protocol,
to interpret the Protocol provisions properly in accordance with the VCLT prin-
ciples would require the judges to develop a truly "holistic" approach-an approach
that would place the text of the Protocol in its broad historical and systemic con-
texts. The AB has made a significant move in this direction by making GATT
Article XX available to the trading rights obligations. But that move is still con-
strained. In the final analysis, it is the failure to interpret China's trading rights obli-
gations in their historical and systemic contexts that prevented the AB from
recognizing the connection between the trading rights obligations and the GATT
disciplines on State trading. And it is the same failure that prevented the AB
from appreciating the WTO-plus nature of the trading rights obligations, causing
180 Above n. 130.
181 Panel Report, para.7.281. The AB report made no mention of the object and purpose of the
Protocol.
182 See the Table of Contents in the Panel Report and AB Report, respectively.
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it to misstate the ways in which China's measures can achieve consistency with
WTO law.
111. The trading rights commitments are just one of the many China-specific
obligations imposed by the Accession Protocol. More WTO-plus and WTO-
minus provisions of the Accession Protocol have entered the pipeline of the
dispute settlement process. 183 How to interpret these provisions coherently and con-
sistently within the WTO treaty framework poses a major challenge to the panels
and the AB. While it might be prudent to decide each case on narrow grounds,
it would be a mistake, as a matter of WTO judicial policy, to view each of the
China-specific provisions in isolation, rather than in the light of the historical
context in which the Accession Protocol was negotiated.
III.E ii. The challenge of systemic commitments
112. The trading rights commitments are broad systemic undertakings that have
introduced a fundamental reform of China's foreign trade regime-a reform that
has essentially privatized all foreign trade activities in China except for a few areas
deemed vital to the State's interests. Commitments at this systemic level are unpre-
cedented in the history of the world trade regime. At issue in this case is China's
policy of keeping the cultural sector off-limits to such reform. The reason for this
exclusion is political: State trading in the cultural sector ensures that the Party
can rely on trusted SOEs to carry out its arbitrary and capricious censorship criteria
in a non-transparent manner. Meanwhile, the trade effect of this policy is unclear.
Thus, by bringing this case to the WTO, the United States was effectively asking the
WTO judiciary to determine what the proper scope of China's systemic reform
should be, and how the Communist Party should run its censorship regime with
respect to imports. Never before had the world trade tribunal engaged in the scru-
tiny of domestic governance at such a deep level.
113. The basic question facing the Panel and the AB was this: does China's policy
limiting the scope of its economic reform for political reasons fall within the legit-
imate policy space of China, or the jurisdictional competence of the WTO? Put in
terms of standards of review, the question was whether the WTO judiciary should
give more deference to China or apply strict scrutiny when reviewing such policy. 184
183 See, e.g., China-Measures related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials (DS394,
DS395, DS398) (involving China's WTO-plus obligation to eliminate all export taxes);
United States-Measures Affecting the Imports of Certain Passenger Vehicle and Light
Truck Tires from China (DS399) (involving WTO-minus China-specific safeguard rules);
and the two cases China has brought against the EU involving "WTO-minus" China-specific
rules on antidumping measures (DS397, DS405).
184 The concept of appropriate levels of scrutiny is often used interchangeably with the concept
of standards of review, which in the WTO context refers to the degree of deference the WTO
adjudicatory body should give to the national authority's factual and legal determinations.
For a comprehensive treatment of the subject, see Matthias Oesch, Standards of Review in
WTO Dispute Resolution (Oxford University Press, 2003). See also Stefan Zleptnig, The
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Clearly, the Panel and the AB chose strict scrutiny. Thus, instead of relying on the
traditional trade-based necessity test under GATT Article XX, the judges created a
trader-based test, focusing on the measures' impact on potential traders in cultural
products rather than on China's foreign trade regime as a whole. 185 The adoption of
the test and the way in which the test was applied ensured that China's policy would
not pass the scrutiny.
114. The problem with this result is not so much about the level of scrutiny
applied, although that is definitely a concern, but the absence of any articulated
rationale in support of the chosen level of scrutiny. For a decision that invalidates
a Member's policy of such political nature, the WTO judiciary owes to the
Member and the institution of the WTO a policy-based explanation. Yet, through-
out the Panel and AB reports, one cannot find any discussion on what China's
trading rights obligations are intended to achieve and how those obligations are sup-
posed to contribute to the objectives of the WTO. Some teleological discussion
would have been necessary to explain why strict scrutiny of China's policy under
Article XX was warranted. 
186
115. The lack of policy-level discussion in the Panel and AB reports is not new.
There has been a tendency at the AB to limit its legal reasoning to textual analysis,
rather than discussing the treaty terms in their broader systemic context and in the
light of their "object and purpose", which would entail inquiries into the underlying
policy considerations.' 8 7 Critics have described the AB's approach as one of "textual
fetishism and policy phobia". 1
8 8
116. It is particularly unfortunate that the "policy phobia" should manifest so
clearly in the interpretation of the Accession Protocol in this case. Being the first
WTO dispute over a major Member-specific obligation (outside GATT and
GATS schedules), the trading rights controversy invited the WTO judiciary to set
out an analytical framework for addressing the special interpretive issues arising
from such obligations in a systematic manner. Instead of taking up the opportunity
to do so, the WTO judges chose to avoid the systemic issues altogether. The only
Standard of Review in WTO Law: An Analysis of Law, Legitimacy and the Distribution of
Legal and Political Authority, 6 European Integration online Papers (2002), No. 17 (eiop.or.
at/eiop/texte/2002-017a.htm).
185 See Section III.B.i.c.
186 See Section III.B.i.a. and IlI.B.i.b.
187 As a former AB member noted, the discussion of object and purpose "does not sit well with
strict constructionism" since it leads to teleological interpretation. See George Abi-Saab, The
Appellate Body and Treaty Interpretation, in: Giorgio Sacerdoti, Alan Yanovich and Jan
Bohanes (eds.), The WTO at Ten: The Contribution of the Dispute Settlement System
(Cambridge University Press, 2006), 453, at 462. But not all AB decisions are in the
same strand. See Horn and Weiler, above n.140, at 252 (pointing out that "when it
appears fit the AB is no less teleological, contextual, or systemic than any other tribunal of
similar standing").
188 Irwin and Weiler, above n.86.
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place in their reports touching upon the systemic dimension of the issues is a state-
ment by the Panel that "we must be mindful of the possibility that the Accession
Protocol may impose obligations on China that are not imposed on other
Members under the WTO Agreement, or are stricter than those that are applicable
to other Members." '189 The point of this statement was not to explain why such
stricter obligations were imposed on China, but to opine that the stricter obligations
should not necessarily prejudice China's ability to regulate trade.1 90 As for the AB, it
did not acknowledge the phenomenon of Member-specific obligations at all,
let alone discussing the issues arising therefrom. Apparently, the unwillingness of
the AB to inquire into the rationale of the China-specific trading rights obligations
not only caused it to be oblivious to the parts of the treaty context that are systemi-
cally most relevant to such obligations, but also rendered it unable to provide a
rationale for the adoption of the trader-based necessity test.
117. The reason why the WTO judiciary shunned policy-level discussions might
be to avoid criticism of "judicial activism" and to ensure the legitimacy of its
decisions. Yet, in failing to articulate the rationale for such a far-reaching decision,
the WTO judiciary paradoxically engaged in policy making in a most active fashion.
The narrow textualist approach taken by the WTO judiciary cannot help but under-
mine the legitimacy of its decision. As Horn and Weiler keenly observed:
There is an appreciable difference in the legitimacy of a decision where the
decisor is seen to have recognized fully the context (understood here in its
broad sense) of the text under interpretation and which is seen to inform
its decision whatever the outcome, and a decision in which the decisor
seems oblivious to the context of its decision. Likewise, and no less impor-
tantly, there is a difference between a decision which is seen to be aware of
its consequences, and is seen to have made its hermeneutic choices in full
awareness of such consequences. When the Vienna Convention speaks of
interpretation in the light of object and purpose it simply invites a consequen-
tialist approach. Jurists' prudence is usually a recipe for good jurisprudence,
but it is not to be confused with narrow textualism.
19 1
118. Regrettably, the Panel and the AB in this case did not demonstrate that they
recognized the systemic context of the trading rights obligations or were fully aware
189 Panel Report, para.7.281 (emphasis added).
190 Id.
191 Horn and Weiler, above n. 140, at 253. They further observed that there is a major difference
in interpretive approach between the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the AB: in con-
trast with "the unwillingness of the AB to situate its legal analyses within a framework which
firmly articulates both the normative and policy considerations and consequences of its
decisions", the ICJ is willing "to go much further in this respect", as evidenced by most of
its cases in the last 20 years. Id.
318 Chinese JIL (2011)
of the political ramifications of their decision. There was no indication that they ever
pondered the question of whether China should be given more deference on a
matter that defines the scope of its domestic economic reform. In the end, it is
unclear whether the Panel and the AB intended by their strict scrutiny to push sys-
temic reforms in China, hence consciously embracing a new model of WTO gov-
ernance, or merely acted out of their gut feelings without fully realizing the
consequences at stake.
IIIE.iii. Other factors
119. The lack of a systemic perspective on the issues raised by China's trading rights
obligations is not just the problem with the WTO judges alone. The reasoning of
the Panel and the AB was shaped to a large extent by the arguments of the dispu-
tants. And the ability of the parties to appreciate the systemic dimension of the issues
may have been affected by the insufficient attention paid to the Member-specific
obligations in the field of WTO study.
III.E.iii.a. China's defence
120. As the defendant in this case, it was incumbent upon China to present the
policy rationale of its measures and explain to the judges what was at stake.
However, instead of framing the issues at a systemic level, China mostly reacted
to the arguments made by the United States. Hence, China did not present its
view as to what its trading rights commitments were intended to accomplish (i.e.
the object and purpose of the trading rights provisions) and why maintaining
State trading in the cultural sector did not interfere with the overall transformation
of China's foreign trade regime. Arguments anchored in the broad systemic context
of the trading rights commitments might have helped the judges to better under-
stand the consequences of their decision and compelled them to articulate the
policy considerations underlying the outcome.
121. China's defence was likely constrained by political and institutional factors.
The government might not want to present its trading rights defence at a systemic
level lest such an approach highlight the fact that China is subject to major systemic
obligations not undertaken by other Members. Because China is politically sensitive
about its WTO-plus obligations and does not wish its WTO membership to be per-
ceived as different from or "inferior" to that of others, 192 it would rather downplay
the significance of such special obligations. At a more concrete level, China did not
raise the issue of common intention. Evidence, such as pre-accession discussions
within the government concerning trading rights in the cultural sector, and official
192 It was observed that in the Doha Round negotiations "China's ultimate goal is to be like
everyone else. China therefore resents some of the terms imposed as part of their WTO acces-
sion, apparently some think as much as they resented the nineteenth century unequal trea-
ties." Robert Wolfe, Sprinting during a Marathon: Why the WTO Ministerial Failed in
July 2008, 44 Journal of World Trade (2010), 81, 114.
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documents showing consistency in relevant law and policy, could have been pre-
sented to demonstrate China's lack of intention to liberalize trading rights in the
cultural sector.193 However, to defend its case in those terms would have implied
an admission of China's missteps in the accession negotiations, which would not
be palatable to the government. Furthermore, China's lawyers would not have
been free to explain the true rationale of the measures at issue-the desire of the
Party to maintain a non-transparent censorship regime.
IIE iii. b. Insufficient attention to WTO member-specific rules
122. There has not been sufficient attention paid to the systemic issues raised by the
Member-specific rules of the Accession Protocol. Of the large number of works on
China and the WTO, only a few articles have focused on these issues. 194 Major
English textbooks on WTO law, for example, rarely mention the existence of
China-specific obligations, let alone discuss their legal and policy implications.1
95
Given the importance of China's accession for the WTO system, it is puzzling
why most mainstream authors have chosen to ignore the issues. One can only
surmise that the lack of attention in the literature did not help the WTO judges
and litigants to become better informed.
IV. Conclusion
123. China-Publications is a landmark case in international law. Among other
things, the decision requires China to restructure its censorship regime governing
the importation of cultural products. The required restructuring, while not intended
to affect censorship criteria substantively, threatens to deprive the Communist Party
of its most efficient means to achieve the level of protection desired by the regime.
Inherently non-transparent, the operation of State trading enterprises enables the
193 Unilateral acts and statements may be accepted as evidence of "the circumstances" of the
treaty's conclusion under Article 32 of the VCLT. Above n. 177.
194 Meanwhile, the problem of political imbalance between the applicant country and the col-
lective incumbent membership in WTO accession negotiations has received more attention.
See, e.g., Kent Jones, The Political Economy of WTO Accession: The Unfinished Business of
Universal Membership, 8 World Trade Review (2009), 279, 310 (pointing out that heavy-
handed treatment of the applicant in accession talks "may poison the well of future trade
negotiations").
195 Of the nine recent English textbooks on WTO law examined by the author, only one briefly
mentions that the terms of China's accession "go beyond the letter" of WTO obligations and
"are widely seen as unfair by the Chinese." Michael J. Trebilcock and Robert Howse, The
Regulation of International Trade (3rd edn., Routledge, 2005), 641. In addition, one
book lists the major terms of China's accession (Raj Bhala, International Trade Law (3rd
edn., LexisNexis, 2008)), and another recognizes the existence of WTO-plus and WTO-
minus provisions for the acceding Members in general (Petros C. Mavroidis, George
A. Bermann and Mark Wu, The Law of the World Trade Organization (West, 2010)).
None of the books provides further analysis.
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Party to keep its censorship criteria confidential, thereby preserving a maximum
degree of flexibility and control. By telling the Chinese government to reconstruct
its censorship machine-a matter at the core of its political system-the WTO
decision has pushed global governance to its contemporary limits.
124. The most remarkable aspect of the decision is this: the WTO judiciary held
China's measures to be WTO-illegal, despite its recognition that the measures were
taken for political rather than protectionist reasons and that the trade effect of the
measure was uncertain. In essence, the WTO has demanded that China abandon
State trading as the means to achieve its censorship objective, and adopt instead a
censorship mechanism that is considered more suitable for a privatized trading
regime. In other words, China should become more like most other countries in
the administration of censorship (in the sense that State trading is not used as a
tool to achieve censorship objectives in most other countries). This decision, there-
fore, is the latest and perhaps most salient indication that the world trading system
has moved beyond its traditional governance model solely concerned with economic
protectionism, towards a new model that mandates convergence in domestic govern-
ance norms.
125. To comply with the WTO decision would require China to engage in
serious reforms of its domestic system. Abolishing State monopoly in cultural
imports would dismantle one of the bastions of China's State-owned economy,
resulting in further privatization of the cultural sector. More critically, the govern-
ment would need to redesign its censorship system to accommodate a potentially
very large number of private importers. When numerous domestic and foreign enti-
ties are allowed to participate, the system must be prepared to provide a basic level of
transparency and due process, which, however, would threaten to undermine the
efficacy of the Party's rule.
126. Ironically, if China were to follow the WTO proposal and establish a new
censorship bureau to perform content review independent of importers, the result
might well be greater restrictions on the importation of cultural products. That is
because under the current system, the SOE importers enjoy a great deal of discretion
in applying censorship criteria and have financial incentives to maximize imports; in
contrast, content reviewers solely responsible to the censorship bureau would be
motivated to screen imports as rigorously and strictly as possible.
127. Given the enormity of the stakes, it is not surprising that China has thus far
failed to fully implement the WTO decision. While a few more steps might be taken
towards compliance, complete liberalization of trading rights is unlikely to occur in
the current political climate. The poor prospect for full compliance highlights the
peril when the WTO attempts to regulate measures that are ultimately political
rather than economic in nature.
128. The Appellate Body in this case has broken new ground in WTO jurispru-
dence. It held for the first time that GATT general exceptions can be made available
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as defence for the breach of another treaty under the WTO Agreement. In so
holding, the Appellate Body took a giant step towards making the enormously
complex treaty structure of the WTO internally coherent.
129. However, the AB decision on trading rights is ultimately problematic for the
following reasons. Firstly, its legal analysis contains serious flaws. Most strikingly,
the AB completely overlooked the GAT provisions on State trading as the relevant
textual context for the trading rights provisions. Consequently, it misstated the way
in which China's measures may become WTO-consistent, and erroneously declared
a judicial standard for identifying the linkage between trade and traders on a case-
by-case basis when such a linkage is manifest in the text of GATT provisions. Sec-
ondly, in the application of Article XX(a), the AB endorsed the trader-based neces-
sity test invented by the Panel without proper reasoning. Given the unclear trade
effect of China's measures, the invention of the trader-based test was critical in
enabling the Panel to invalidate the measures under Article XX(a). Yet, for such a
key element in the decision, neither the Panel nor the AB provided any meaningful
analysis as to why the new test was warranted. Thirdly, the decision was made with
little regard to its consequences. The judges understood very well that the challenged
measures were taken for political reasons and that requiring China to restructure its
censorship regime would be a highly politically sensitive matter. Nonetheless, they
chose to apply strict scrutiny to invalidate the measures, relying on a proposed
alternative censorship mechanism that they considered to be reasonably available
to China but without a real understanding of, or concern for, its potential political
repercussions. Moreover, for such a far-reaching decision, the judges failed to articu-
late any normative or policy rationale in support, which cannot help but undermine
the legitimacy of the decision.
130. The problems identified above are attributable to the special difficulties of
interpreting Member-specific rules within the WTO multilateral treaty framework.
But they ultimately expose the fatal weakness of the narrow textualist approach taken
by the WTO judiciary. The trading rights obligations involved in this case are sys-
temic commitments undertaken by China to transform its foreign trade regime into
a market-based one. The basic question confronting the Panel and the AB, there-
fore, was whether China should be allowed to exclude the cultural sector from
the scope of its systemic reform for political reasons. In arriving at the negative
answer to this question, the judges did not discuss what the trading rights obli-
gations are intended to accomplish, how these obligations relate to the WTO objec-
tives and what effect the challenged measures have had on the reform intended by
these obligations. In other words, in determining whether China's measures can be
excused by Article XX(a), the judges failed to interpret the Article XX(a) exception
in the light of the object and purpose of the trading rights provisions and of the
WTO Agreement, as is required by the interpretive rules of the VCLT. Evidently,
the unwillingness of the judges to inquire into such object and purpose prevented
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them from appreciating the historical and systemic contexts of the trading rights
provisions. As a result, they were unable to identify the textual contexts that are sys-
temically most relevant to the trading rights provisions, or to articulate a normative
or policy rationale to support their chosen level of scrutiny under Article XX(a). In
the end, what the public received is a far-reaching WTO decision ostensibly built
upon a literal construction of the "ordinary meaning" of the words.
131. When all is said and done, there is a basic lesson to be learned. The W'TO is
not designed to regulate the domestic political systems of its members. Pushing
the limits of WTO governance beyond what it is designed to do risks creating
more non-compliance cases, ultimately undermining the effectiveness of the
WTO system.
